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GUEST WORKER PROGRAMS ARE NO FIX FOR
OUR BROKEN IMMIGRATION SYSTEM:
EVIDENCE FROM THE NORTHERN
MARIANA ISLANDS
Dorothy E. Hill*

“Never under any condition should this Nation look at an immigrant as primarily a labor unit. He should always be looked at
primarily as a future citizen . . . .”
—Theodore Roosevelt, 19171

I. INTRODUCTION
The Obama administration has promised to take on immigration reform in 2010.2 What is fueling this latest reform effort, and all other recent efforts, is the formidable problem of the 10.8 million undocumented
immigrants who currently reside in this country as of January 2009, and
the countless undocumented immigrants likely to come.3 The principal ills
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1. Theodore Roosevelt, Mobilize Our Man Power, KAN. CITY STAR, Dec. 17,
1917, reprinted in ROOSEVELT IN THE KANSAS CITY STAR, WAR-TIME EDITORIALS BY
THEODORE ROOSEVELT 58 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1921).
2. Julia Preston, White House Plan on Immigration Includes Legal Status, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at A10. The immigration system is widely considered to be
broken. See RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22574, IMMIGRATION
REFORM: BRIEF SYNTHESIS OF ISSUES 1 (2007) (“There is a broad-based consensus
that the U.S. immigration system, based upon the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA), is broken.”).
3. See Michael Hoefer, NANCY RYTINE & BRYAN C. BAKER, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2009 1
(2010).
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cited as justifying reform include the national security threat presented by
an unsecure border that is breached by thousands of unauthorized immigrants each year,4 the violence associated with human smuggling, and the
widespread mistreatment of unauthorized immigrants.5 The extraordinary
legislation recently passed by the State of Arizona that criminalizes moving about the state without citizenship documents adds to the urgency for
reform.6 There is also the specter of an increasingly militarized southern
border, which is already patrolled by more than 20,000 Border Patrol
agents and fortified by more than 600 miles of fence.7 The tightened bor4. See Remarks by the President on Comprehensive Immigration Reform, THE
WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y (July 1, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-comprehensive-immigration-reform (stating
that immigration reform is essential to achieving the goal of securing U.S. borders). In
addition, while debating the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act [hereinafter
CIRA] of 2006, senators repeatedly cited the need for a “secure border” as one justification for reform. See 152 CONG REC. S4530 (daily ed. May 15, 2006) (statement of
Sen. Reid) (noting that this proposed legislation would ensure “good, sound longterm border security”); id. at S4536 (statement of Sen. Leahy) (referring to piecemeal
enforcement efforts to secure the nation’s borders as “little more than political posturing” and pointing to comprehensive immigration reform as essential to achieving
border security).
5. See Remarks by the President on Comprehensive Immigration Reform, THE
WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y (July 1, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-comprehensive-immigration-reform (citing
the vulnerability of unauthorized immigrants to “unscrupulous businesses who pay
them less than the minimum wage or violate worker safety rules” and that such businesses will unfairly compete with law-abiding businesses, as one reason for pursuing
immigration reform); Evaluating a Temporary Guest Worker Program: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Sec. & Citizenship on S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 1–3 (2004) (statement of Sen. John McCain) [hereinafter Hearing Evaluating a Temporary Guest Worker Program] (recounting a recent apprehension of 158 undocumented immigrants who had been held by smugglers in wretched
conditions in an Arizona house without proper plumbing or access to food as an illustration of the need for comprehensive immigration reform); see also id. at 31 (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl) (referring to this same incident but adding that “assault,
battery, [and] rape . . . that frequently occurs with regard to the people who are being held”).
6. See Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2010, at A1. However, on July 28, 2010, a federal judge granted
an injunction preventing the enforcement of many provisions of the law. United
States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010). The 9th Circuit recently affirmed the district court’s decision to block the bill from taking effect. United States v.
Arizona, No. 10-16645, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 7413 (9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2011).
7. See CHAD C. HADDAL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32562, BORDER SECURITY: THE ROLE OF THE U.S. BORDER PATROL 13 (2010) (reporting that the number of Border Patrol agents assigned to the southern border increased from 3,555 in
1992 to 20,119 at the end of fiscal year 2009); Randal C. Archibold, National Guard
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der controls have led to a surge in migrant deaths as border-crossers are
forced deeper into the desert to circumvent the fence and to dodge agents
and troops.8 Any comprehensive immigration reform package attempting
to solve these problems will likely include a large-scale unskilled guest
worker program.9 Indeed, the introduction of such a program was cited as
one of “four pillars” of reform by Senators Charles Schumer and Lindsey
Graham when they announced a “blueprint” for comprehensive immigration reform in March 2010.10 In July 2010, this plan was endorsed by President Obama.11
Generally, guest worker programs allow aliens to enter the host
country for a defined period to work, but not to settle.12 The world over,
unskilled guest workers typically perform the “3-D jobs: dirty, dangerous,

Will Be Deployed to Aid at Border, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2010, at A1 (reporting that
President Obama planned to send an additional 1,200 National Guard troops to the
southwestern border to assist with border security); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO- 10-877R, BRIEFING ON U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION’S
BORDER SECURITY FENCING, INFRASTRUCTURE AND TECHNOLOGY 25 (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10877r.pdf. It has been recognized by many that
enforcement alone cannot resolve the problem of unauthorized immigration. See, e.g.,
Remarks by the President on Comprehensive Immigration Reform, THE WHITE
HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y (July 1, 2010), available at http://www.white
house.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president comprehensive-immigration-reform (asserting that while his administration had devoted significant resources to putting
“boots on the ground” at the nation’s borders, “our borders are just too vast for us to
be able to solve the problem only with fences and border patrols. It won’t work.”).
8. See Haddal, supra note 6, at 25–26 (noting that approximately 300 to 400
migrants died each year between 2000 to 2004 and approximately 400 to 500 died
between 2005 to 2009 with deaths declining to 423 in 2009); James C. McKinley, Jr.,
An Arizona Morgue Grows Crowded, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2010, at A14 (reporting
that as of July 2010 there were a record number of bodies of suspected unauthorized
immigrants found in and around Tucson, Arizona, and suggesting that tougher enforcement measures “pushed smugglers and illegal immigrants to take their chances
on isolated trails through the deserts and mountains of southern Arizona, where they
must sometimes walk for three or four days before reaching a road”).
9. See ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32044, IMMIGRATION:
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO GUEST WORKER PROGRAMS 33–35 (2007)
(outlining the Bush administration’s temporary worker program under its reform proposals, the primary focus being its temporary worker program).
10. Charles E. Schumer & Lindsey O. Graham, The Right Way to Mend Immigration, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2010, at A23.
11. Peter Baker, Obama Exhorts Congress to Back Immigration Overhaul, N.Y.
TIMES, July 2, 2010, at A12.
12. See ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32044, IMMIGRATION:
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO GUEST WORKER PROGRAMS 1–2 (2010)
[hereinafter 2010 CRS GUEST WORKER REPORT]. The term “guest worker” is a term
used in many countries to refer to unskilled temporary workers. Id. at 1.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\41-1\NMX103.txt

134

unknown

Seq: 4

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

7-NOV-11

14:01

[Vol. 41

and difficult.”13 To date, guest worker programs in the United States have
been small in scale and designed to fill temporary gaps in the country’s
labor force, not to serve as a significant component of the nation’s immigration policy.14 To meet these specific labor goals, all of these programs
have tied guest workers’ visa status to their continued employment with a
single employer, and have provided no path to citizenship.15 Additionally,
they have all lacked effective government oversight and accessible and
meaningful avenues to enforce guest worker rights.16 These and other factors have led to widespread abuses of guest workers, including wage theft,
dangerous working conditions, and substandard housing.17 Program after
program has been compared to the institution of slavery.18
Nevertheless, many politicians and business interests—including the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and even the World Bank—have made the
inclusion of a guest worker program a centerpiece of their immigration
reform agenda.19 Even some immigrant advocacy and labor rights
groups—long harsh critics of guest worker programs—have softened
13. PHILIP MARTIN, ET AL., MANAGING LABOR MIGRATION IN THE TWENTY
FIRST CENTURY 83 (2006) [hereinafter MARTIN, MANAGING LABOR MIGRATION]; see
also News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Census of Fatal
Occupational Injuries (Aug. 20, 2009), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/
cfoi.htm.
14. See MARTIN, MANAGING LABOR MIGRATION, supra note 13, at 83–85,
94–97, 105–10. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, guest (or temporary)
workers in the United States are referred to as “nonimmigrants.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(15)(F)-(L) (2006). Existing guest worker programs are administered by the
U.S. Department of Labor, not the U.S. Citizens & Immigration Services (USCIS).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(1) (2006).
15. See discussion infra Part III.
16. Id.
17. See generally MARY BAUER, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CTR., CLOSE TO
SLAVERY: GUEST WORKER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES (2007) [hereinafter
SPLC REPORT].
18. See, e.g., Lou Dobbs Tonight (CNN new television program Jan. 23, 2007)
(interview with Rep. Charles Rangel describing the H-2 guest worker programs as
“the closest thing I’ve ever seen to slavery”).
19. See Press Release, World Bank, Migration Can Deliver Welfare Gains, Reduce Poverty, Says Global Economic Prospects 2006 (Nov. 16, 2005), http://web.world
bank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20724214~pagePK:6425704
3~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html); Immigration Issues, U.S. CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, http://www.uschamber.com/issues/index/immigration/default (last visited
May 24, 2011). Indeed, leading Republicans, including John McCain, announced in
2008 that they would support immigration reform legislation only if it expanded the
nation’s guest worker programs. See Jeff Zaleny & Ginger Thompson, Republicans
Focus on Guest Workers in Immigration Debate, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2009, at A12;
see also Daniel Griswold, Economic Watch: Will Democrats repeat mistakes in the
name of immigration reform? WASH. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2009, at A4 (Daniel Griswold,
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their opposition to including a guest worker program as part of a comprehensive immigration reform package.20 For many in the immigrant and
labor communities, this shift is seen as a reasonable and necessary compromise, far superior to the military-style, enforcement-only approach to
reform that has gained favor in recent years,21 and the only reasonable
means to accommodate the future flow of migrants after those unauthorized immigrants who are already in the country are granted the right to
adjust their status, or are deported.22 For some others, a guest worker
program represents a modern evolution from a nationalist to a cosmopolitan perspective that shows “equal concern to all” across borders by providing impoverished people from other countries a legal means to access
the relative plenty in the United States.23 Still others, including many immigrants themselves, have come to support a large-scale guest worker
program because of the possibility it presents for accommodating the increasingly transnational character of many immigrant lives; specifically,
new immigrants tend to support more circular patterns of migration, and
seek to retain deeper connections to their country of origin than in the
past.24
The emerging support among the immigrant and labor communities
is conditioned upon an assumption of a reformed guest worker program.25
the Director for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, calling a guest worker
program “the missing ingredient in the ongoing effort to curb illegal immigration”).
20. See, e.g., Janet Murguia, A Change of Heart on Guest Workers, WASH. POST,
Feb. 11, 2007, at B7 (article by then-president of the National Council of La Raza
explaining the organization’s cautious shift to supporting guest worker programs as a
means of dealing with the future flow of immigrants in an orderly humane way).
21. See Daniel Ibsen Morales, In Democracy’s Shadow: Fences, Raids, and the
Production of Migrant Illegality, 5 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 23, 61–65 (2009) (describing
the nation’s current immigration policy as centered around its “criminalization” of
migrants).
22. See Janet Murguia, A Change of Heart on Guest Workers, WASH. POST, Feb.
11, 2007, at B7.
23. See, e.g., Howard F. Chang, Guest Workers and Justice in a Second-Best
World, 34 U. DAYTON L. REV. 3, 6–7, 10–11 (2008) (describing expansion of guest
worker programs as a “second-best policy” to the present policy of exclusion).
24. See Manuel Pastor & Susan Alva, Guest Workers and the New Transnationalism: Possibilities and Realities in an Age of Repression, 31 SOC. JUST. 92, 92–93
(2004), available at http://www2.ucsc.edu/cjtc/docs/Guest_Workers_Transnationalism.
pdf; SCOTT BITTLE, ET AL., PUBLIC AGENDA, A PLACE TO CALL HOME: WHAT IMMIGRANTS SAY NOW ABOUT LIFE IN AMERICA 40 (2009), available at http://
www.publicagenda.org/files/pdf/Immigration.pdf (citing a survey that found that immigrants overwhelmingly support a guest worker plan).
25. See, e.g., Chang, supra note 23, at 7–8 (advocating for reformed guest worker
programs, calling particularly for mobility as a means to prevent guest worker
abuses); Janet Murguia, A Change of Heart on Guest Workers, WASH. POST, Feb. 11,
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The authors of recent comprehensive immigration bills with a guest
worker component, most notably Senators John McCain and the late Edward Kennedy in their 2005 bill, have also been cognizant of the problematic history of guest worker programs, and have made concerted and
thoughtful efforts to design programs with more safeguards and worker
rights.26 The McCain-Kennedy guest worker proposal allowed employees
to change jobs, created an administrative complaint system, and established more government oversight.27 It also created a path to citizenship—a right that must be earned by remaining continuously employed
for several years, and meeting all other program requirements.28 Most
comprehensive immigration reform bills since the McCain-Kennedy bill
have included these reforms in their respective guest worker components;
it is likely that a similar program will be included in any reform package
to come.29
The evidence presented in this article establishes that a large-scale
unskilled guest worker program, even with McCain-Kennedy–style safeguards,30 would neither alleviate immigrant worker abuse nor quell the
flow of unauthorized immigrants, at least in the absence of a terrific dedication of enforcement resources. In addition, it would likely create a host
of new problems created by the very safeguards designed to protect guest
2007, at B7 (stressing that the proposed program La Raza supported contained far
more protections than past or current programs).
26. See Secure America and Orderly Immigration Act, S.1033, 109th Cong.
(2005); 152 CONG. REC. S4947 (daily ed. May 23, 2006) (Sen. Kennedy speaking in
favor of the bill noted that “[i]mmigrant workers are among the most vulnerable in
our Nation. While performing society’s most difficult and dangerous work, they face
abuse by employers, the denial of basic rights, and economic exploitation. In negotiating the McCain-Kennedy bill, we took great care to include protections that will halt
these alarming trends and ensure fair wages and working conditions for guest
workers.”).
27. See discussion infra Part III.D.
28. This is referred to as “adjustment of status.” S. 1033, 109th Cong. § 306
(2005).
29. See generally 2010 CRS GUEST WORKER REPORT, supra note 12 (outlining
various bills and regulations that have sought to modify the existing guest worker
programs).
30. This article does not speak to the possibility of programs that radically depart from the models that have existed to date. Jennifer Gordon has begun to envision
such a program. Under her proposed framework, international labor organizations
would take the lead role in governing and monitoring guest worker programs, and the
participants would be “transnational labor citizens.” See Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 503, 504–505, 568–70 (2007). While even
Gordon has acknowledged that conditions are not quite ripe for transnational labor
organizations to assume control over immigration, the model she has proposed could,
one day, transform immigration policy. Id. at 568–70.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\41-1\NMX103.txt

Spring 2011]

unknown

Seq: 7

GUEST WORKER PROGRAMS

7-NOV-11

14:01

137

workers, including, a flood of both valid and fraudulent worker complaints and predatory sham employment arrangements to enable guest
workers to remain in the country and on the path to citizenship. As such,
this “reform” would essentially add a state-administered system of exploitation of nonimmigrant workers alongside the already existing extralegal system of exploitation of unauthorized immigrant workers, marking
a significant step back in the nation’s slow but steady legislative march
toward curtailing exploitation of workers. Accordingly, a guest worker
program should not be part of immigration reform.
In Part II, this article makes the case for employing an evidencebased approach to the question of whether a guest worker program
should be a component of comprehensive immigration reform. It argues
that this methodology is critical when one of the targets of the legislation
is a group as marginalized as unskilled guest workers. Part III of this article lays out the evidence, beginning first with a discussion of the country’s
largest unskilled guest worker program to date, the Bracero program,31
along with existing federal unskilled guest worker programs and the
problems associated with these programs. It then describes recent proposals for reform, focusing on McCain-Kennedy–style proposals that
seem the most likely to gain traction in the upcoming months and years.
Part IV then reviews the evidence presented by the guest worker program of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI).
This program was unique in the United States because the CNMI controlled its own immigration from 1976 until November 28, 2009, and during that time established a sweeping guest worker program.32 This article
will demonstrate that the CNMI’s guest worker program had far more
worker protections than comparable federal programs, including more
employment mobility and an accessible, administrative complaint system
with robust remedial powers. In this way, the CNMI program resembled
the McCain-Kennedy–style programs. This part will show that notwithstanding such safeguards, the CNMI’s guest worker program was notori31. See infra note 69.
32. Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in
Political Union with the United States of America, PUB. L. NO. 94-241, 90 Stat. 263
(codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1801 note). This anomaly came to an end on November 29,
2009, when the federal immigration laws were extended to the CNMI pursuant to
Title VII of the Consolidated Natural Resources Act of 2008, PUB. L. NO. 110-229,
122 Stat. 754, § 702 (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1806) [hereinafter CNRA]. For further
discussion of this Act, see infra Part II. The CNMI enacted the Nonresident Workers’
Act (NWA) in 1983, modeling it after a nonresident workers law that had been part of
the Trust Territory Code. Sagana v. Tenorio, 384 F.3d 731, 734 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 3
N. MAR. I. CODE §§ 4411 et seq. (1983); Protection of Resident Workers Act, 49 Trust
Territory Code § 1 et seq. (1970)).
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ous, characterized by sweatshop conditions, a high incidence of human
trafficking, and an ineffectual administrative apparatus charged with
preventing these problems.33 Part V compares the CNMI guest worker
example with McCain-Kennedy–style programs, arguing that the
problems that defined the program in the CNMI will almost certainly accompany any large-scale federal program.
Part VI explores the connection between exploitation and guest
worker programs. In doing so, it considers why all U.S. unskilled guest
worker programs, both past and present, including one run by a far-flung
U.S. commonwealth, have all resulted in widespread abuse of guest workers. It argues that this result is inevitable because, by design, unskilled
guest worker programs rely on poor migrants’ economic, cultural, and
linguistic vulnerability to maximize their economic output. As such, unskilled guest worker programs are not a solution to the ills associated
with unauthorized immigration, but, rather, serve to perpetuate these ills
with the aid of state apparatus. They should therefore not be a component of comprehensive immigration reform.
II. EVIDENCE AS A TOOL FOR CRAFTING
TRANSFORMATIVE, RATIONAL LEGISLATION IN THE
OFTEN IRRATIONAL ARENA OF IMMIGRATION POLICY
Daniel Ibsen Morales has argued that the nation’s contemporary immigration policy has become characterized by “discord” and “schizophrenia.”34 The central example Morales points to in support of these
characterizations are the hundreds of miles of fence that have been built
along the United States/Mexico border to prevent unauthorized immigration, even though at least 40 percent of unauthorized immigrants arrive in
the United States by legal avenues and then overstay their visas.35 The
fence building continues despite evidence that the fences along the border have only led to an increase in migrant deaths because of the treacherous routes migrants now take to get around them.36 Morales attributes
this irrationality to the nation’s high regard for “ordered liberty,” which
“privileges the democratic will” over effective solutions and ties the
hands of administrative authority, curtailing the mediating effect adminis-

33. See Glenn Schloss, Lured by jobs “in the US,” workers denied even basic
human rights; “Factories of hell” in paradise, S. CHINA MORNING POST (HONG
KONG), Jan. 24. 1999, at 3; discussion infra Part IV.
34. Morales, supra note 22, at 27–30.
35. Id. at 64–65.
36. Id. at 53.
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trative expertise might bring to bear.37 To embrace the “strictest kind of
order” in the realm of immigration (and in others), is only to widen the
divide between those who enjoy the liberties and rights of the nation and
those to whom they are foreclosed.38
The federal government’s approach to the CNMI’s guest worker
program stands as another example of the nation’s schizophrenic approach to immigration reform. For more than a decade, Congress has
tried numerous times to wrest control over immigration from the CNMI
based on concerns about the abuses associated with its guest worker program. (The efforts finally succeeded in November 2009).39 In 1997, the
U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, in a report about the CNMI,
described its immigration system as “antithetical” to U.S. immigration
principles and ideals.40 The report stated:
The CNMI immigration system is antithetical to the principles
that are at the core of U.S. immigration policy. Over time, the
CNMI has developed an immigration system dominated by the
entry of foreign temporary contract workers. These now outnumber U.S. citizens but have few rights within the CNMI and, in
some cases, are subject to serious labor and human rights abuses.
In contrast to U.S. immigration policy, which admits immigrants
for permanent residence and eventual citizenship, the CNMI admits aliens largely as temporary contract workers who are ineligible to gain either U.S. citizenship or civil and social rights within
the commonwealth. Only a few countries, and no democratic society, have immigration policies similar to the CNMI. The closest
equivalent is Kuwait.
The end result of the CNMI policy is to have a minority population governing and severely limiting the rights of the majority
population who are alien in every sense of the word.41

Similarly, in support of another effort to take control of the CNMI’s
immigration in 1999, Senator Murkowski charged that the CNMI’s guest
worker program failed to comport with the “American tradition of employing U.S. workers in private sector jobs that promote the growth of a
middle class,” and disdainfully described it as a system of “importing and

37. Id. at 27 (deriving the term “ordered liberty” from Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
38. See id. at 86.
39. CNRA, PUB. L. NO. 110-229, 122 Stat. 754, §§ 702–705 (codified at 48 U.S.C.
§§ 1806, 1808).
40. See U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, IMMIGRATION AND THE
CNMI 4 (1997).
41. Id.
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exploiting a rolling stream of alien workers, without permanent immigrant status or family ties, in low-paid permanent positions.”42 Finally, in
one of the many oversight hearings held by Congress in 2007 in the leadup to passing the federal legislation that ended the CNMI’s local control
of its immigration, then-Deputy Assistant Secretary for the U.S. Department of the Interior’s Office of Insular Affairs, David Cohen, described
the guest worker program in the CNMI as having created “a risk of exploitation and abuse.”43 He further cautioned:
Our experience tells us . . . that excessive reliance within the
CNMI on a foreign, low-wage work force creates a risk of abuse.
That risk could be overcome with a high level of effort, vigilance
and resources, but it would probably be difficult to sustain such
efforts under the CNMI’s current fiscal and economic conditions . . . [a]nd eliminating the most overt forms of abuse will not
necessarily eliminate subtler forms of exploitation that arise when
foreign employees have little power and a great deal to lose if they
assert even the limited rights they have.44

Remarkably, at nearly the same time, in some other Capitol hearing
room, lawmakers were considering introducing a federal large-scale unskilled guest worker program as part of comprehensive immigration reform that would have looked very similar to the CNMI program the
government was preparing to dismantle.45 In addition, since gaining control over the CNMI’s immigration system, the federal government is now
in the process of replacing the CNMI’s guest worker program with the
arguably more exploitative H-2A and H-2B guest worker programs,
while maintaining the same “rolling stream of alien workers, without permanent immigrant status or family ties” that led the federal government
to intervene in the first place.46
42. S. REP. NO. 106-204, at 32 (1999).
43. Conditions in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands: Hearing
Before the Comm. on Energy and Natural Res., 110th Cong. 7 (2007) (statement of
David B. Cohen, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for the Office of Insular Affairs, U.S. Dep’t
of the Interior), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110shrg35819/pdf/
CHRG-110shrg35819.pdf [hereinafter Conditions in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands].
44. Id. at 11.
45. See, e.g., CIRA of 2007, S. 1348, 110th Cong. (2007) (including a nearly identical guest worker program as the 2006 reform bill); CIRA of 2006, S. 2611, 109th
Cong. (2006) (including a large-scale unskilled guest worker program).
46. S. REP NO. 106-204, at 32 (1999) (quoting Bo Cooper, Gen. Counsel Immigration & Naturalization Service). “ ‘Extending federal immigration law to the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas closes the guest worker loophole under which
so many were held in modern slavery. The Constitution’s guarantee of freedom must
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This dichotomy deserves the attention of those who seek to craft
legislation that will truly fix our broken immigration system, as does the
rich body of evidence generated by the CNMI program. To capitalize on
this evidence, scholars and legislators should employ the evidence-based
methodology developed by Ann and Robert Seidman to the question of
whether a large-scale guest worker program should be a part of comprehensive immigration reform. The Seidmans have long-observed that data
gathering and analysis of the existing problem, including the law governing the issue, the institutions enforcing it, and the impact on the target
groups, is generally incomplete.47 To address these shortcomings, the
Seidmans have developed an evidence-based approach to drafting legislation (called an “institutional legislative theory and methodology,” or
ILTAM).48 Key to their evidence-based approach is to first engage in a
“careful description” of the existing problem; second, focus on the problematic behavior of the targeted group and the involved agencies; and
third, develop reasoned hypotheses as to the causes of the problem.49 In
this way, ILTAM aims to lead to the drafting of law that ensures “effective implementation.”50

apply everywhere in the United States, no matter how remote.’ ” Press Release, H.
Comm. on Nat. Res., House Clears Final Hurdle for CNMI Immigration Bill (Apr. 29,
2008) (quoting H. Judiciary Comm. Chairman John Conyers, Jr.), available at http://
unheardnomore.blogspot.com/2008/04/s-2739-passes-house.html; see also CNRA,
PUB. L. NO. 110-229, 122 Stat. 754, §§ 702–705 (codified at 48 U.S.C. §§ 1806, 1808)
(Title VII of the CNRA extends the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to
CNMI); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-553, DHS SHOULD CONCLUDE NEGOTIATIONS AND FINALIZE REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAW n.5 (2010) (stating that the “CNRA established federal control of
immigration on June 1, 2009, but granted the Secretary of Homeland Security the
authority to delay the start of the transition period for up to 180 days . . . . The Secretary of Homeland Security elected to delay the transition period start . . . to November 28, 2009 . . . .”).
47. Ann Seidman & Robert B. Seidman, The Role of Congress in the TwentyFirst Century: Panel II: Is Legislation an Unprincipled, Incoherent, Undignified Mess?
ILTAM: Drafting Evidence-Based Legislation for Democratic Social Change, 89 B.U.
L. REV. 435, 437–43 (2009) [hereinafter ILTAM: Drafting Evidence-Based Legislation
for Democratic Social Change]. Some scholars have observed that the promulgation
of ineffective laws often stems from legislators’ tendency to gloss over data related to
the marginalized groups and legislation targets. See, e.g., Ruby Andrew, Child Sexual
Abuse and the State: Applying Critical Outsider Methodologies to Legislative Policymaking, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1851, 1855 (2006).
48. ILTAM: Drafting Evidence-Based Legislation for Democratic Social Change,
supra note 47, at 436 n.1.
49. Id. at 469–75.
50. See id. at 466–68.
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ILTAM finds strong support in legal realism and instrumentalism,
and rests on a belief that law can effect social change by inducing desired
behaviors.51 ILTAM posits that evidence-based legislation might give
voice to the less powerful in that it sets in motion a rational discourse
such that a critic must come forward with more or different evidence to
counter a well-supported legislative proposal.52 A methodology like
ILTAM that considers, values, and exhaustively gathers and analyzes existing data of the often silenced guest workers’ experiences is critical.53
III. FEDERAL UNSKILLED GUEST WORKER PROGRAMS
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
A. The Features of Guest Worker Programs That Invite Worker
Exploitation
Included under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) are numerous “temporary worker” (or guest worker) programs.54 These admit
foreign nationals into the country for a limited period of time to perform
specific types of work.55 Visas are available for various categories of
workers, including nurses, professional specialty workers, internationally
recognized entertainers, agricultural workers, and unskilled nonagricultural workers.56 In 2007, 1.9 million temporary worker visas were issued.57
All contain some type of a labor market test to guard against the dis-

51.
52.

See id. at 462–66.
See id. at 482 (citing JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE
ACTION, 8–42 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1984)); see also Robert B.
Seidman, Justifying Legislation: A Pragmatic, Institutionalist Approach to the Memorandum of Law, Legislative Theory and Practical Reason, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 20
(1992) (arguing that “[t]he rejection of rationality in favor of power as the principal
mode of policy-making reflects the interests of power and privilege”).
53. Guest workers are not wholly without representation. Certainly, the governments of sending countries, most prominently Mexico, would likely have some input
in the form or implementation of guest worker programs. See, e.g., 2010 CRS GUEST
WORKER REPORT, supra note 12, at 14 (noting that the Bush administration discussed
potential guest worker programs with its Mexican counterpart in 2001 as part of the
two nations “binational migration talks”). But the potential workers themselves, all of
whom are noncitizens, and most of whom are not physically in the United States,
likely have few means to express their interests or concerns.
54. See 8 U.S.C. § 1188 (2006).
55. See RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31381, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY ON TEMPORARY ADMISSIONS 1 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 CRS IMMIGRATION POLICY REPORT]; 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2006).
56. 2011 CRS IMMIGRATION POLICY REPORT, supra note 55, at 3.
57. Id. at 11.

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\41-1\NMX103.txt

Spring 2011]

unknown

Seq: 13

GUEST WORKER PROGRAMS

7-NOV-11

14:01

143

placement of domestic workers.58 Traditionally, these programs have been
used to fill temporary gaps in the domestic labor market without adding
settlers to the population.59 However, in recent years, temporary worker
programs have been used increasingly to meet ongoing labor market demands and, for skilled workers, as a feeder for those applying to become
employment-based legal permanent residents.60 Most immigration reform
proposals would move immigration policy even further in this direction.61
This part of the article will focus on unskilled federal guest worker programs, as compared to skilled programs, because that is the type of program that is likely to be included in a comprehensive reform package.
Before turning to the evidence, it is important to create a frame
through which to consider these programs. There is a consensus that the
principal characteristics that lead to guest worker exploitation include:
(1) the practice of tying guest workers’ immigration status to a single employer (or, a lack of “portability”);62 (2) a dearth of effectual government
oversight and accessible and meaningful avenues to enforce guest worker
rights;63 and (3) an absence of a path to citizenship.64 Although high recruitment fees are also cited as a significant factor leading to the exploitation of guest workers because workers generally must go deep in debt in
order to repay the fees, this article will pay particular attention to the
three aforementioned factors.65 Historically, all unskilled guest worker
programs in the United States have shared these characteristics, and all
have been characterized by widespread exploitation of the guest work-

58.
59.

See id. at 6.
Philip Martin, Guest Workers: New Solution or New Problem, 2007 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 289, 294 [hereinafter Martin, Guest Workers: New Solution or New
Problem].
60. SPENCER ABRAHAM, ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., IMMIGRATION AND
AMERICA’S FUTURE: A NEW CHAPTER 21 (2006), available at http://
www.migrationpolicy.org/ITFIAF/finalreport.pdf.
61. See discussion infra Part III.D (describing comprehensive reform packages
proposed in 2005, 2006, and 2007, all of which contained proposals for large-scale,
long-term guest worker programs and a path to citizenship for workers).
62. SPLC REPORT, supra note 17, at 1.
63. SPLC REPORT, supra note 17, at 99.
64. See Principles for Comprehensive Immigration Reform, COALITION FOR
COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM, http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?bc
=6755%7C25669%7C19898%7C18690%7C27899%7C21960 (last visited Apr. 20,
2011); Michael Wishnie, Labor Law After Legalization, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1446, 1455
(2008) (noting that from a “labor rights perspective,” “genuine” portability and a path
to permanent legal status as essential to preserving the individual liberty of guest
workers and preventing workplace exploitation and abuse).
65. SPLC REPORT, supra note 17, at 9–14.
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ers.66 They have also been accompanied by a depression of wages in industries most populated by guest workers.67 Finally, all guest worker
programs have led directly and indirectly to unauthorized immigration.68
B. The Bracero Program69
The Bracero program represents one of the United States’ largest
guest worker programs to date, importing as many as 400,000 Mexican
farm workers per year during its height.70 The program was commenced
66. See Protecting U.S. and Guest Workers: The Recruitment and Employment of
Temporary Foreign Labor: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 110th
Cong. 49 (2007) [hereinafter Protecting U.S. and Guest Workers: The Recruitment and
Employment of Temporary Foreign Labor] (statement of Jonathan P. Hiatt, Gen.
Counsel, AFL-CIO) (“[T]he current system is a blueprint for exploitation of workers . . . AFL-CIO’s answer to the ‘immigration crisis’ . . . has three core principles:
(1) the law must provide a real mechanism by which all undocumented workers can
regularize their status; (2) foreign workers must hereafter come into the United States
with full and equal access to workplace protections . . . and (3) enforcement of labor
laws must go hand-in-hand with enforcement of immigration laws.”); see also U.S.
COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, 1997 REPORT TO CONGRESS: BECOMING AN
AMERICAN: IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANT POLICY 81–102 (1997).
67.
See Gerald Mayer, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33772, THE COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM ACT OF 2006 (S. 2611): POTENTIAL LABOR MARKET EFFECTS OF THE GUEST WORKER PROGRAM 16 (2006) (concluding that an increase of
foreign workers “could be expected to lower the relative wages of competing U.S.
workers” and that the impact would likely be greatest “on young, native-born minority men and on foreign-born minority men in their early working years”).
68. MARTIN, MANAGING LABOR MIGRATION, supra note 13, at 95 (noting that
based on the history and legacy of the Bracero program, guest worker programs are
“the best way to begin a flow of immigrants,” not a means of quelling that flow).
69. Bracero means “strong arm” in Spanish. The Bracero program’s official
name was the “Mexican Labor Program” [Mexican Farm Labor Program], which was
created by Congress in 1942 as part of an omnibus appropriations bill known as Public
Law 45. Guestworker Programs for Low-Skilled Workers: Lessons from the Past and
Warnings for the Future: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Sec.
& Citizenship of the S. Judiciary Comm., 108th Cong. 100 (2004) (statement of Dr.
Vernon Briggs, Professor of Industrial & Labor Relations), available at http://
www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/pdf/108hrg/94556.pdf) [hereinafter Guestworker
Programs for Low-Skilled Workers: Lessons from the Past and Warnings for the
Future]. It was extended by subsequent enactments until 1947, and then continued
informally until 1951 when it was officially extended by Public Law 78. Id. Martin,
Guest Workers: New Solution or New Problem, supra note 59, at 298.
70. See Temporary Agricultural Work Visa Programs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration & Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 37
(1997) [hereinafter Hearing on Temporary Agricultural Work Visa Programs] (statement of Bruce Goldstein, Co-Exec. Dir., Farmworker Justice Fund, Inc.); 2010 CRS
GUEST WORKER REPORT, supra note 9, at 1. Martin, Guest Workers: New Solution or
New Problem, supra note 59, at 298.
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during WWII with the stated aim of alleviating the alleged shortage of
resident workers due to the war.71 However, the program did not end
with the war, but continued until 1964.72 During the life of the program,
approximately 4.5 million jobs were filled by braceros.73
On paper, the law governing the program contained many provisions designed to protect the braceros from exploitation, as well as provisions to protect domestic workers from displacement and wage
depression.74 Specifically, growers using the program had to: (1) have individual contracts with workers under the supervision of the government;
(2) provide housing that complied with minimum standards; (3) pay the
higher of either the minimum or the prevailing wage; (4) offer at least
thirty days of work; and (5) share the burden of paying transportation
costs with the worker and U.S. government.75 In addition, the federal government was required to support workers if a grower failed to pay.76
In practice, however, braceros were subjected to terrible working
conditions, with low wages, minimal work, and squalid living conditions.77
Indeed, the U.S. Department of Labor (U.S. DOL) officer in charge of
the program, Lee G. Williams, described the program as a system of “legalized slavery.”78
These poor conditions have been attributed in part to the fact that
the workers were tied to a single employer.79 Also credited was the pau71. Shannon Leigh Vivian, Be Our Guest: A Review of the Legal and Regulatory
History of U.S. Immigration Toward Mexico and Recommendations for Combating
Employer Exploitation of Non-immigrant and Undocumented Workers, 30 SETON
HALL L.J. 189, 197 (2005).
72. 2010 CRS GUEST WORKER REPORT, supra note 12, at 1.
73. SPLC REPORT, supra note 17, at 4. The actual number of guest workers who
entered the country under the program may have only been one to two million because many were repeat participants in the program. See PHILIP L. MARTIN, PROMISE
UNFULFILLED UNIONS, IMMIGRATION AND THE FARM WORKERS 46–47 (2003) [hereinafter MARTIN, PROMISE UNFULFILLED: UNIONS, IMMIGRATION AND THE FARM
WORKERS].
74. See SPLC REPORT, supra note 17, at 4–5.
75. Id. at 4.
76. Id.
77. See id. (citing ERNESTO Galarza, STRANGERS IN OUR FIELDS (1956));
Michael Holley, Disadvantaged by Design: How the Law Inhibits Agricultural Guest
Workers from Enforcing Their Rights, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 575, 585 (2001)
(recounting a bracero’s experience: “ ‘They treated us like animals. . . . But, as a
bracero, you knew you couldn’t complain.’ ”) (internal quotation omitted).
78. SPLC REPORT, supra note 17, at 2 (quoting THEO J. MAJIKA & PATRICK H.
MOONEY, FARMERS’ AND FARM WORKERS MOVEMENTS 152 (Twayne Publishers
1995)).
79. See Lorenzo A. Alvarado, A Lesson from My Grandfather the Bracero, 22
CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 55, 61 (2001).
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city of resources allocated to the U.S. DOL to enforce the program.80
Another contributing factor was the braceros’ reluctance to lodge complaints because it was widely understood that growers would blacklist any
bracero who complained and return him to Mexico.81 Because most
braceros arrived in the United States deeply in debt—in part on account
of the bribes and fees it was necessary to pay Mexican officials to secure a
job through the program—few were willing to risk such retaliation.82
The program also caused a depression in agricultural wages and the
displacement of a significant number of domestic agricultural workers.83
This outcome was due largely to the U.S. DOL’s failure to correctly determine the prevailing wage, along with the meager bargaining power of
debt-laden braceros relative to debt-free domestic workers.84 Given a
choice, growers preferred braceros over domestic workers because they
were more “dependable,” which was merely a euphemism for
vulnerable.85
Finally, while one of the stated aims of the Bracero program was to
reduce the number of unauthorized Mexican workers, their numbers ac-

80. See Holley, supra note 77, at 585 (citing ERNESTO GALARZA, MERCHANTS
LABOR: THE MEXICAN BRACERO STORY 47 (1964)) (citing as an example of the
DOL’s insufficient resources its inadequate number of qualified personnel to calculate farmworkers’ prevailing wage, as required by the law, instead DOL just accepted
employers’ representations).
81. Id. at 585.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 584; see also Philip L. Martin, Guest Workers: Past and Present, in
MEXICO-UNITED STATES BINATIONAL MIGRATION STUDY, U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, MIGRATION BETWEEN MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES:
BINATIONAL STUDY 877, 882 (1998), available at http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/uscir/
binpapers/v3a-3martin.pdf [hereinafter Martin, Guest Workers Past and Present] (explaining a presidential commission report from 1951 that determined the Bracero program was detrimental to domestic farm laborers); Linda Levine, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL 95-712, IMMIGRATION: THE LABOR MARKET EFFECTS OF A GUEST
WORKER PROGRAM FOR U.S. FARMERS (2009) (citing a study by a pair of researchers
in which they examined seven states, which employed more than 90 percent of
braceros, and concluded that the Bracero program decreased domestic farm employment and lowered farm wages by 6 to 7 percent, but expanded total farm employment
by about 120,000); Guestworker Programs for Low-Skilled Workers: Lessons from the
Past and Warnings for the Future, supra note 72, at 101 (statement of Dr. Vernon
Briggs, Professor of Industrial & Labor Relations) (testifying that the wide availability of Mexican workers from the Bracero program significantly depressed wages in
some regions, particularly the Southwest where agricultural employment was “virtually removed from competition with the nonagricultural sector”).
84. See Holley, supra note 77, at 584–85 (citing ERNESTO GALARZA,
MERCHANTS OF LABOR: THE MEXICAN BRACERO STORY 47 (1964)).
85. Id.
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tually increased during the program years.86 Most scholars agree that the
principal enduring legacy of the Bracero program is the significant population of undocumented Mexican immigrants in the country today.87 Specifically, many of these modern immigrants follow patterns of migration
and dependence established during the Bracero period.88 The Bracero
program ended on December 31, 1964, after a documentary about the
program, Harvest of Shame, was aired on CBS, purportedly convincing
President Kennedy that the program was adversely affecting wages and
working conditions for U.S. workers.89
C. H-2A and H-2B Programs90
There are two federal programs in existence for unskilled guest
workers: the H-2A program, for temporary agricultural guest workers,91
and the H-2B program, for temporary nonagricultural unskilled guest
workers.92 The programs are administered jointly by the Employment and
86. See Martin, Guest Workers Past and Present, supra note 83, at 881 (1998)
(attributing the increase in unauthorized workers to the realization of these workers
that they could avoid paying bribes to Mexican officials by entering the United States
without authorization, and to employers’ preference because employers did not need
to cut through any “red tape,” like subjecting themselves to government inspections).
87. Martin, Guest Workers: New Solution or New Problem, supra note 59, at 295
(noting that most researchers point to the Bracero program as the genesis of undocumented Mexican migration).
88. See id.
89. MARTIN, PROMISE UNFULFILLED: UNIONS, IMMIGRATION AND THE FARM
WORKERS, supra note 73, at 50.
90. Nonimmigrant visas are commonly referred to by the subsection letter and
number that designates their category under section 1101(a)(15) of the INA. For
instance, guest workers who enter the country as skilled “specialty workers and
fashion models” pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) are referred to as H-1B
workers; those entering as unskilled “agricultural workers” pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a) are referred to as H-2A workers; and guest workers entering
as unskilled “nonagricultural” workers pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b)
are referred to as H-2B workers. See Temporary (Non-immigrant) Worker, U.S.
CITIZEN & IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (follow
“Working in the US,” then follow “Temporary Workers,” and then follow links “H1B,” “H-2A,” and “H-2B”) (last visited June 27, 2011).
91. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a) (2006).
92. Id. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b). Guest workers are referred to as “non-immigrant aliens” under the INA. See id. § 1101(a)(15). The three most common H-2B
occupations by industry in 2007 were: laborer/landscaper (62,442); cleaner/housekeeper (22,347) and construction worker (totaling 17,697). OFFICE OF FOREIGN LABOR CERTIFICATION, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FOREIGN LABOR CERTIFICATION:
INTERNATIONAL TALENT HELPING MEET EMPLOYER DEMAND, PERFORMANCE RE31, 33 (2007), available at http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/pdf/
PORT
FY2007_OFLCPerformanceRpt.pdf. Not all guest workers who gain admission to
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Training Administration (ETA) of the U.S. DOL and the U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services (USCIS) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), with all enforcement responsibilities related to employer
violations of worker rights handled by the U.S. DOL’s Wage and Hour
Division.93 While the exact numbers vary each year, more than 100,000 H2A workers are admitted into the United States annually (although there
exists no statutory cap), and approximately 66,000 H-2B workers (which,
in most years, represents the statutorily mandated cap).94 All H-2 workers
are authorized to enter the country to work solely for the petitioning employer,95 generally for a period of less than a year, although visas may be
extended for up to three years.96 An H-2 visa provides no path to permanent residence.97
For an employer to obtain a visa for an H-2 worker, the DOL must
“certify” that capable U.S. workers are unavailable, and that employing
guest workers will not adversely affect wages and working conditions.98
To gain certification, H-2B employers need only attest to their efforts to
recruit United States workers at the prevailing wage.99 H-2A employers,

work under the H-2B program are unskilled; for instance, professional athletes and
entertainers are also admitted under this nonimmigrant category. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 655.3(b) (2011).
93. See 2010 CRS GUEST WORKER REPORT, supra note 12, at 2; 29 C.F.R.
§ 501.1(c) (2011). While there is no specific delegation in the case of H-2B workers,
most would fall within the WHD’s jurisdiction as the agency is charged with enforcing
the wage and other provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). See Wage and
Hour Division: Major Laws Administered/Enforced, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://
www.dol.gov/whd/regs/statutes/summary.htm. (last visited Apr. 23, 2011).
94. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC.,
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS: TEMPORARY ADMISSION OF NON-IMMIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES 65 (2010) (reporting that in 2009, 56,381 H-2B workers were admitted and 149,763 H-2A workers).
95. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(b)(9) (2011); see also 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(A) (2011)
(indicating that to employ an H-2A or H-2B worker a U.S. employer must file a petition). If more than one employer wants to employ the same worker, both must file a
petition. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(C). If a worker seeks to work for a different employer, then the new employer must file a petition and receive approval before employing the worker. Id. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(D).
96. See id. § 214.2(h)(15)(ii)(C); 2010 CRS GUEST WORKER REPORT, supra note
12, at 2, 6.
97. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(16)(ii).
98. RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33977, IMMIGRATION OF
FOREIGN WORKERS: LABOR MARKET TESTS AND PROTECTIONS 17 (2010).
99. Id. New H-2B (and H-2A) regulations were enacted in 2009 in the final days
of the Bush administration. One significant change in both was the creation of an
“attestation-based” certification process, rather than a more cumbersome process that
required submission of various forms of proof that the employer had made a diligent
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on the other hand, must submit documentation demonstrating that they
undertook local recruiting efforts and met all other program requirements.100 In particular, they must demonstrate that they are offering
wages that meet (or exceed) the highest of four different wage rates: the
federal or applicable state wage rate, the Adverse Effect Wage Rate
(AEWR), the prevailing wage, or an agreed upon collective bargaining
rate.101
The H-2 programs are widely disfavored by worker advocates. They
have been criticized as being exploitative and abusive of the guest workers, notwithstanding the existence of significant employee protections and
benefits on paper, at least for H-2A workers.102 Specifically, H-2A workers are entitled to: (1) housing; (2) meals; (3) transportation from housing
to work; (4) reimbursement for travel from the country of residence after
having completed 50 percent of the contract; (5) workers’ compensation
for injuries and illness incurred in the course of employment; and (6) a
return ticket to the worker’s residence upon completion of the contract.103
In addition, they are guaranteed to be paid for three-fourths of the
workdays of work promised in the contract (referred to as the “3/4 guarantee”) unless a domestic worker is found within the first 50 percent of
the contract period (in which case the employer must hire the domestic
search for qualified domestic workers before it could gain certification. See id. at
14–15, 17. The Bush H-2A regulations were recently replaced in February 2010 with
new regulations that reinstate the certification process previously in effect. Temporary
Agricultural Employment of H-2A Aliens in the United States, 75 Fed. Reg.
6884–6995 (Feb. 12, 2010).
100. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.121–122 (2011).
101. 2010 CRS GUEST WORKER REPORT, supra note 12, at 5–6. Notably, under
the 2009 version of the regulations enacted in the final days of the Bush administration, the wage rate was calculated in a way that significantly lowered the wage rate for
H-2A workers. See N.C. Growers’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Solis, 644 F. Supp. 2d 664, 666, 669–70
(M.D.N.C. 2009) (denying the Obama administration’s effort to suspend the new regulations on the grounds that the complaining North Carolina growers would be irreparably harmed were the rules allowed to be suspended because the new rules
effectively lowered the wages the growers would have to pay from $9.34 under the old
rule, to between $7.25 and $8.51 under the Bush regulations). As noted in supra note
99, in February 2010 the DOL issued new regulations, reinstating many aspects of the
old regulations, including those related to wage calculations.
102. See discussion infra Part III.C.3.
103. 20 C.F.R. § 655.122; see also Withdrawal of Interpretation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act Concerning Relocation Expenses Incurred by H-2A and H-2B Workers, 74 Fed. Reg. 13261-01 (Mar. 26, 2009) (withdrawing from the interpretation in 73
Fed. Reg. 77148-52 (Dec. 17, 2008), for the H-2A program, and 73 Fed. Reg. 78039-41
(Dec. 18, 2008) for the H-2B program; these interpretations that did not require employers to reimburse H-2A and H-2B workers earning the minimum wage for relocation expenses).
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employee, may terminate the H-2A worker, and is not bound by the 3/4
guarantee).104 Remarkably, the only benefit or safeguard afforded H-2B
workers is the right to workers’ compensation.105 As will be discussed below, to the extent the law provides H-2 workers with any benefits or
rights, they have proven largely theoretical due to a lack of effective enforcement mechanisms and reluctance by most H-2 workers to complain.
Additionally, H-2 workers have been credited with driving down wages in
the industries with the greatest number of guest workers, largely due to
lax enforcement of the wage rate requirements.106
The programs are also unpopular with employers who find them
cumbersome and inefficient and their many obligations overly burdensome.107 These criticisms prompted the Bush administration, during its final days in power, to promulgate new regulations aimed at streamlining

104. 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(i) (2011).
105. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.22 (2011) (setting forth the very few obligations imposed
upon H-2B employers; there is no mention of benefits or worker protections comparable to those that exist for H-2A workers); see also SPLC REPORT, supra note 17, at
25–26 (noting that this one “benefit,” workers’ compensation, is often effectively unavailable to H-2 workers because the rules of many states bar or limit nonresident
family members from receiving death benefits, or require that an injured worker see a
doctor in the state—an impossible requirement to meet if an H-2 worker is no longer
authorized to be in the country).
106. See SPLC REPORT, supra note 17, at 21 (discussing the decrease in wage
rates for tree planters in Alabama, and attributing the decline to a recent modification
by the DOL in its methodology for determining the prevailing wage and to the substantial number of guest workers employed in tree planting in Alabama who have no
ability to bargain for better wages); LINDA LEVINE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 95-712
E, IMMIGRATION: THE LABOR MARKET EFFECTS OF A GUEST WORKER PROGRAM
FOR U.S. FARMERS 6 (2004) (noting that while the H-2A program has likely not
driven down farm wages, in part because of low utilization of the program, it might
have a more substantial effect on wages in certain local labor markets that rely heavily on guest workers); Gordon, supra note 30, at 541–42 (2007) (arguing that the Adverse Effect Wage Rate (AEWR), which governs H-2A guest worker wage rates,
while set above the minimum wage, acts as a ceiling to farm worker wages because
when wages increase an employer may declare applicants “unavailable” and become
authorized to bring in workers from abroad).
107. See ARIN GREENWOOD, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., THE CASE FOR REFORMING U.S. GUEST WORKER PROGRAMS 4 (2008), available at http://cei.org/
contributor/arin-greenwood (follow “The Case for Reforming U.S. Guest Worker
Programs”) (noting that the U.S. DOL itself has described the H-2A application process as “slow, burdensome, duplicative, and expensive”); Temporary Employment of
H-2A Aliens in the United States, 73 Fed. Reg. 77110-01 (Dec. 18, 2008) (2008 rule
governing H-2A workers (since replaced) referring to many employer comments criticizing various program requirements, like the obligation to provide employee housing
as a “serious impediment to program participation”).
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the application and certification process for both H-2 programs.108 The
Obama DOL has since promulgated new H-2A regulations that reversed
most of the changes, and has proposed similar H-2B regulations.109
1. Portability
With a few limited exceptions, H-2 workers cannot change jobs
without losing their visa status.110 Nor can H-2 workers quit work—even
if their employers have violated work agreements, failed to pay wages or
overtime, or committed some other labor violation—without risking deportation because H-2 workers’ immigration status rests solely on their
employment with their petitioning employer.111 On rare occasions, the law

108. See Changes to Requirements Affecting H-2A Non-Immigrants, 73 Fed.
Reg. 76891-01 (Dec. 18, 2008) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 214, 215, 217a); Labor
Certification Process and Enforcement for Temporary Employment in Occupations
Other Than Agriculture or Registered Nursing in the United States (H-2B Workers),
and Other Technical Changes, 73 Fed. Reg. 78020-01 (Dec. 19, 2008) (to be codified at
8 C.F.R. pts. 655, 656). These regulations were fiercely opposed by advocates of guest
workers who believe that streamlining and other elements would leave H-2 workers
even more vulnerable to abuse. See, e.g., The Department of Labor Fiscal Year 2010
Budget and Priorities for Enforcing the Rights of Guest Workers: Hearing Before the
H. Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. of Oversight & Gov’t Reform,
111th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/news?page=15
(follow “SPLC to Congress: Protect H-2B Guest Workers . . . ”) (statement of Mary
Bauer, Director Immigrant Justice Project at the Southern Poverty Law Center)
[hereinafter Bauer testimony] (describing the regulations as having “Eviscerated the
Few Protections that Existed for Guestworkers”).
109. See Temporary Agricultural Employment of H-2A Aliens in the United
States, 75 Fed. Reg. 6884–6995 (Feb. 12, 2010); Temporary Non-Agricultural Employment of H-2B Aliens in the United States, 76 Fed. Reg. 15130 (proposed Mar. 18,
2011); see also 2010 CRS GUEST WORKER REPORT, supra note 12, at 5–6 (providing
an overview of the new rules). Both sets of regulations were prompted, in part, by
order of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which invalidated parts of the Bush H2B regulations and ordered the U.S. DOL to promulgate new provisions. See 76 Fed.
Reg. at 15131–32 (discussing Comité de Apoyo a los Trabajadores Agricolas (CATA)
v. Solis, Civil No. 2:09-cv-240-LP, 2010 WL 3431761 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2010), and the
various provision the CATA court invalidated). U.S. DOL also recently promulgated
new regulations governing the calculation of the prevailing wage for H-2B workers
Wage Methodology for the Temporary Non-agricultural Employment H-2B Program
Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 3452 (Jan. 19, 2011) (revising 20 C.F.R. § 655.10).
110. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(b)(9) (2011) (stating that “[a]n alien in [H-2] status
may be employed only by the petitioner through whom the status was obtained” except in the case of a professional athlete, who may change employers after being
“traded” under certain circumstances).
111. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(b)(6)(v)(9) (providing that aliens employed under H2A and H-2B status “may be employed only by the petitioner through whom the
status was obtained.”).
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allows H-2A workers to transfer employers when the petitioning employer cannot fulfill the contract.112 But even then, workers can only
transfer to employers who are certified to employ H-2A workers; if such
employers cannot be found, the workers must depart the country.113 In
the case of H-2B workers, they have even fewer opportunities to change
employers because, since 2004, the H-2B cap has always been reached,
and generally very quickly.114 Accordingly, it is nearly impossible for H2B workers to find new employers certified to hire them, even under the
rare conditions that might allow a worker to change employers.115 And,
for all H-2 workers, no employment with a certified employer means that
the workers must leave the United States or face the loss of their authorized nonimmigrant status and the possibility of deportation.116
2. Government Oversight and Accessible Avenues for Complaint
As noted above, the U.S. DOL’s Wage and Hour Division (WHD)
has enforcement authority over employment-related complaints by H-2
workers.117 It also possesses the authority to bar employers from future
hiring of H-2 workers based on past violations of worker rights and to
conduct workplace investigations.118 In addition, guest workers may pursue private actions against employers in court.119
In practice, the WHD has largely failed to protect H-2 workers
through its affirmative enforcement mechanisms, and it is nearly impossible for H-2 workers on their own initiative to vindicate their rights
through WHD channels or private litigation. First, the WHD has seldom
taken effective steps to prevent worker abuses by consistently monitoring
employer worksites or barring employers with a record of violating

112. 20 C.F.R.§ 655.122(o) (2011).
113. See id.
114. Greenwood, supra note at 107, at 5.
115. Id.
116. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(a)(3)(ii) (2011) (requiring nonimmigrants, including H2A and H-2B workers, to agree to depart the United States at the end of their visa
period, or upon abandonment of their authorized nonimmigrant status, or face loss of
their nonimmigrant status). Performing unauthorized work, such as for an employer
other than the petitioning employer, may constitute a “failure to maintain” authorized nonimmigrant status. Id. § 214.1(e).
117. 29 C.F.R. § 501.1(c) (2011) (H-2A workers); 20 C.F.R. § 655.50(a) (2011)
(H-2B workers).
118. See 8 U.S.C. § 1188(b)(2)(A)–(B) (2006) (providing conditions for denial of
labor certification for H-2A employers); 20 C.F.R. § 655.65 (2011) (describing other
remedies for violations by H-2 employers).
119. See Laura Parker, Guest Workers Sue Companies Over Pay, Foreign laborers
in visa program allege exploitation, USA TODAY, Nov. 15, 2006, at 1A.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\41-1\NMX103.txt

Spring 2011]

unknown

Seq: 23

GUEST WORKER PROGRAMS

7-NOV-11

14:01

153

worker rights.120 Specifically, as of 1997 the WHD had never denied an
application to employ H-2A workers because of previous violations of
worker rights.121 In 2004, the WHD conducted only 89 investigations of
H-2A employers.122 As a result of this lack of enforcement, many H-2
workers are not aware of the rights afforded to them under the law.
In addition, local WHD offices are not accessible or equipped to
effectively resolve complaints lodged by guest workers; this is the case
even though the H-2A regulations expressly give these workers a right to
pursue administrative complaints with the WHD.123 Guest workers generally do not know where U.S. DOL offices are located, most offices are
only open during business hours when guest workers are working, and
most are not set up to help workers who do not speak English.124 Moreover, the majority of guest workers work in remote locations, with scant
access to transportation (other than what is provided by the employer).125
In the rare instances in which H-2 workers find their way to a U.S. DOL
office, file a complaint, and the WHD successfully carries out an investigation, the fines and other remedies are generally so little they are ineffective as a means of deterring future violations.126 By way of example,
the U.S. DOL website reports that eight out of approximately 6,500 H2A employers in 2009 have been temporarily barred from employing H2A workers, and that five out of approximately 7,300 employers in 2009
have been temporarily barred from employing H-2B workers.127

120.
121.

See Bauer testimony, supra note 108.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-HEHS-98-02, H-2A AGRICULTURAL GUEST WORKER PROGRAM, CHANGES COULD IMPROVE SERVICES TO EMPLOYERS AND BETTER PROTECT WORKERS 62 (1997).
122. Lornet Turnbull, New State Import: Thai Farmworkers, THE SEATTLE TIMES,
Feb. 20, 2005, at A1. There does not seem to be data on the number of H-2B sites that
have been investigated in recent years.
123. See Bauer testimony, supra note 108 (testifying that local U.S. DOL agencies
are “difficult to access, many lack the ability to communicate with workers in languages other than English . . . are completely inaccessible to workers outside of
traditional work hours . . . [and] lack[ ] the capacity to deal with workers calling internationally”); Holley, supra note 77, at 599 (describing how there is no set procedure for initiating or investigating H-2A complaints, no guarantee that they will be
pursued by the U.S. DOL, and no timeline for investigations).
124. See Bauer testimony, supra note 108.
125. SPLC REPORT, supra note 17, at 31, 37.
126. See Bauer testimony, supra note 108.
127. See OFFICE OF FOREIGN LAB. CERTIFICATION, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, PROGRAM DEBARMENTS 2, http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/pdf/Debartment_List_
Revisions.pdf. (last visited June 28, 2011); H-2A Program Data, FOREIGN LAB. CERTIFICATION DATA CTR. ONLINE WAGE LIBR., http://www.flcdatacenter.com/CaseH2A.
aspx (last visited May 5, 2011) (using data downloaded from “H-2A Disclosure Data
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Notably, in a 2009 report on WHD, the General Accountability Office (GAO) essentially concluded that the agency was failing to protect
the workplace rights of low wage workers, including their basic right to be
paid at least the minimum wage for all hours worked.128 The report attributes botched investigations, long delays and a failure to follow up with
employers who agreed to pay back wages due as the reasons for this failure.129 One illustrative example described in the report is a case in which a
GAO investigator posed as a complainant reporting possible child employment at a factory with dangerous machinery.130 No investigation was
undertaken for four months.131 Ultimately, only one of a total of ten fictitious cases that were presented to the WHD was handled properly, and
even that one was marked by significant delays.132 While the report does
not specifically mention guest workers, most fall squarely within the underserved group of low-wage workers.
Certainly, one reason for the failings of the WHD is that there are
desperately few investigators. According to a 2005 study by the Brennan
Center for Justice, over the period 1975–2004, enforcement activities and
resources allocated to the U.S. DOL “either stagnated or declined” at the
same time that the workforce steadily increased.133 Specifically, during
this period, the number of workers covered by the wage and hour laws of
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) grew by 55 percent (from
56,648,000 in 1975 to 87,691,695 in 2004), while the number of WHD investigators declined by 14 percent (from 921 in 1975 to 788 in 2004).134
While in 2010, the U.S. DOL hired 250 new WHD investigators—bring-

2009” and determining that approximately 6,500 employers requested H-2A certification in 2009); H-2B Program Data, FOREIGN LAB. CERTIFICATION DATA CTR. ONLINE WAGE LIBR., http://www.flcdatacenter.com/CaseH2B.aspx (last visited June 20,
2011) (using data downloaded from “H-2B Disclosure Data 2009” and determining
that approximately 7,280 employers requested H-2B certification in 2009).
128. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-458T, WAGE AND
HOUR DIVISION’S COMPLAINT INTAKE AND INVESTIGATIVE PROCESSES LEAVE LOW
WAGE WORKERS VULNERABLE TO WAGE THEFT (2009).
129. Id. at 4.
130. Id. at 5.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 4–5 (citing that it took one investigator working on the first complaint five weeks to contact the fictitious employer “but another investigator working
on the second complaint contacted the fictitious employer immediately”).
133. Annette Bernhardt & Siobhán McGrath, Trends in Wage and Hour Enforcement by the U.S. Department of Labor, 1975–2004, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. AT NYU
SCH. OF LAW, 1 (No. 3 Sept. 2005), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/page/d/
download_file_35553.pdf.
134. Id. at 2.
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ing the number of WHD investigators up to 949135—this still translates
into approximately one investigator for every 91,600 covered workers—a
ratio that cannot possibly ensure adequate enforcement of any of the
many laws under the WHD’s jurisdiction, let alone close monitoring of
the H-2 programs.136 What is more, the cases that involve serious abuses
of the kinds to which guest workers are particularly vulnerable—like
forced labor and debt peonage—require the investment of even more
scarce resources than other cases.137
Given the WHD’s shortcomings, the only viable avenue for relief
open to most H-2 workers is private litigation. This avenue is also full of
nearly insurmountable obstacles. First, many fear a lawsuit would be met
with retaliation from recruiters in the workers’ sending countries or result
in the workers being blacklisted and unable to secure employment in the
future.138 Second, it is very difficult for H-2 workers to find legal representation because of geographic isolation and lack of transportation.139 Moreover, H-2B workers have been deemed ineligible for Legal Services
assistance because of their nonimmigrant status.140 Of course, most H-2
workers, particularly those whose rights have been violated by their employer, do not have funds to pay private attorneys.141
Finally, there is no certain or established procedure available to H-2
workers who have stopped working for their petitioning employer due to
labor violations to secure the right to remain in the country.142 In most

135. Jeremy Gantz, Labor Dept.’s New “Sheriff” Offers Overdue Help to WageTheft Victims, IN THESE TIMES, Apr. 1, 2010 4:41PM, http://www.inthesetimes.com
/ working / entry / 5771 / labor_dept.s_new_sheriff_offers_overdue_help_to_wage-theft_
victims (reporting that the DOL has recently hired 250 investigators and that the
budget was back to pre-2001 levels).
136. The ratio is based on an estimate of 87 million covered workers. See Bernhardt & McGrath, supra note 133, at 2 (Figure One) (reporting that more than 87
million workers were covered by the FLSA in 2004) This number has likely grown
since reported in 2004.
137. See HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., U. CAL. BERKELEY & FREE THE SLAVES, HIDDEN SLAVES: FORCED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 16–17 (2004) [hereinafter HIDDEN SLAVES: FORCED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES] (citing an anonymous DOL
WHD official who discussed the difficulties in handling forced labor cases that often
arise in the agricultural sector where most workers are immigrants, and very vulnerable to abuse).
138. SPLC REPORT, supra note 17, at 16–17.
139. Id. at 31.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 30.
142. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(a)(3)(ii) (2011) (requiring nonimmigrants, including H2A and H-2B workers, to agree to depart the United States at the end of their visa
period, or upon abandonment of their authorized nonimmigrant status, or face loss of
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cases, the only avenue available to them is to seek deferred action status
from USCIS.143 Deferred action is a purely discretionary, non-reviewable
action by USCIS to delay removal proceedings against an individual, or
class of individuals, generally for humanitarian reasons, for instance, because the nonimmigrant is suffering medical problems.144 However, the
process for obtaining deferred action is shrouded in mystery and never a
certainty.145 To begin, it is granted solely at the discretion of USCIS, has
no statutory basis, and only passing reference is made to it in the federal
regulations.146 In addition, there are no regulations or publicly posted procedures for filing for deferred action, nor is there any mechanism for entheir nonimmigrant status); Title 8, section 214.1 of the C.F.R., which contains DHS’s
regulations governing nonimmigrants including H-2A and H-2B workers, makes no
mention of providing workers who have left their petitioning employer because of
labor violations with an alternative visa status that would allow them to remain in the
country while seeking remedial action against the employer. DHS regulations do provide for special nonimmigrant status for alien victims of severe forms of trafficking in
persons, id. § 214.11(f)(1), and for alien victims of certain qualifying criminal activity,
id. § 214.14(a)(9). Thus, these visas can provide temporary status to H-2A and H-2B
workers who are victims of serious crimes, such as, “involuntary servitude, peonage,
debt bondage, or slavery,” id. § 214.11(f)(1), or rape, torture, the slave trade, or abusive sexual contact, among other serious crimes, id. § 214.14(a)(9), but not to victims
of wage theft, sex discrimination, or other civil labor and employment law violations.
Cf. Leticia M. Saucedo, A New “U”: Organizing Victims and Protecting Immigrant
Workers, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 891, 892 (2008) (proposing that the “U” visa, which
grants nonimmigrant status to victims of crime who have “suffered substantial physical or mental abuse as a result” of the crime and are cooperating with law enforcement in the investigation or prosecution of the crime, become one of the tools used by
labor advocates to address workplace abuses of unauthorized immigrants).
143. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (referring to “deferred action” as “an act of
administrative convenience to the government which gives some cases lower
priority”).
144. See Memorandum from Prakash Khatri, CIS Ombudsman, to Dr. Emilio T.
Gonzalez, Dir., USCIS 3 (Apr. 6, 2007), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/CISOmbudsman_RR_32_O_Deferred_Action_04-06-07.pdf (last visited June
21, 2011).
145. Id. (suggesting that the USCIS does not maintain even a “minimal level of
transparency” with respect to deferred action, and suggesting by way of reform, that
USCIS provide basic information on deferred action “including 1) general criteria for
relief; 2) what information to include with the submission, and 3) where to submit a
request”). Human Rights Watch recently recommended that deferred action be routinely granted to guest workers while pursuing legal claims for workplace violations.
See Tough, Fair and Practical: A Human Rights Framework for Immigration Reform
in the U.S., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 6–7 (2010), available at http://www.hrw.org/node/
91455 (follow “Download this Report”).
146. Id. at 1 (while the ombudsman in this memo made several recommendations,
including that the USCIS “post general information on deferred action on its website,” it does not appear that this recommendation has been implemented).
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suring that uniform standards are being applied across the country, nor
formal statistics kept on requests, grants and denials, or any way to appeal a decision related to a deferred action request.147 Accordingly, there
is no guarantee an H-2 worker pursuing legal action against an employer
will be granted such status. Nor is there any guarantee that a worker who
has left the country can gain readmission to participate in litigation because that also lies within the discretion of USCIS.148
3. Abuses of H-2 Workers Are Commonplace Along with Depressed
Wages
By many accounts, exploitation and abuse of H-2 workers is commonplace.149 H-2 workers are routinely cheated of wages.150 It is also common for them to have to pay kickbacks and up-front fees to labor
contractors and recruiters.151 In one recent case, H-2B guest workers paid
$3,500 to $5,000 to work for hotels in New Orleans for a nine-month pe-

147. See id.
148. See, e.g., Bauer testimony, supra note 108 (recounting a case in which a
named plaintiff in a class action handled by SPLC was not granted a visa to testify at
his own deposition).
149. See generally SPLC REPORT, supra note 17 (a report outlining the exploitation and abuse suffered by guest workers); Laura Wides-Munoz, Migrants See Abuse
in Guest Worker Jobs, WASH. POST, June 2, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/06/02/AR2007060200049.html (recounting stories of guest
workers forced to pay kickbacks to growers’ contractors and the exploitation suffered
by farm workers under such a system).
150. See Janine Zeitlin, Ignored and Cheated; Farm Workers Earn Nada in
America’s Green Bean Capital, MIAMI NEW TIMES, Mar. 14, 2008, http://www.smfws
.com/articles2008/march2008/art03142008d.htm (quoting a local community organizer
describing wage theft in the industry as “massive and ubiquitous” and noting that
“[i]t’s rare to find an immigrant worker in South Dade who hasn’t been ripped off at
some point”).
151. Laura Wides-Munoz, Migrants See Abuse in Guest Worker Jobs, WASH.
POST, June 2, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/
02/AR2007060200049.html. Since November 2009, the law has prohibited the collection of recruitment or other placement fees by employers, or others, and required that
petitions be denied or revoked if it is established that such fees were sought or collected. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(5)(xi)(A) (2011) (for H-2A workers); id.
§ 214.2(h)(6)(i)(B) (2011) (for H-2B workers). In such cases the worker will have
thirty days to return to his country of residence (at the employer’s expense), or to find
another employer. Id. § 214.2(h)(5)(xii) (for H-2A workers); id. § 214.2(h)(6)(i)(B)
(for H-2B workers). It is too early to tell whether this prohibition can, or will, be
effectively enforced.
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riod after Hurricane Katrina.152 Under the contract terms, each guest
worker would have had to work full time for three to four months just to
pay off the recruitment fee debt.153 As it turned out, the employer did not
even provide the workers with full-time work.154 Another tactic routinely
used by H-2 employers to control and intimidate workers is to seize
workers’ travel documents upon arrival.155 It is also widely understood
that these workers are particularly vulnerable to human trafficking.156 Indeed, in an effort to curb this abuse, the State Department recently published a pamphlet aimed at preventing trafficking of H-2 workers and
other nonimmigrant visa holders.157 Finally, in industries and in geographic areas where H-2 guest workers are employed in substantial numbers, wage rates have declined.158
D. McCain-Kennedy–Style Bills
In May 2005, the McCain-Kennedy comprehensive immigration reform bill was introduced in the Senate, representing the first of numerous
immigration reform packages that were introduced during the years 2005
to 2007—the last time that comprehensive immigration reform legislation
was introduced.159 One component of each of the comprehensive propos152. Workers Pay up to $5,000 for Post-Katrina Hotel Jobs, S. POVERTY LAW
CTR. (Apr. 2007), http://www.splcenter.org/publications/close-to-slavery-guestworkerprograms-in-the-united-states/recruitment-exploitation-be-1.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See SPLC REPORT, supra note 17, at 2 (noting the frequent practice of taking guest workers’ travel documents, an observation based on interviews with
thousands of guest workers and “scores of legal cases”).
156. See HIDDEN SLAVES: FORCED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note
137, at 3 (recommending, among other actions, that the U.S. government eliminate
the visa requirement that ties an employee to a single employer as a step towards
combating forced labor).
157. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Informational Pamphlet to Protect
Guest Workers and other Non-Immigrants (June 23, 2009), available at http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/06a/125279.htm (announcing the publication of a new
pamphlet, aimed at preventing trafficking and exploitation of nonimmigrant visa
holders; the pamphlet specifies the rights of H-2A and H-2B workers, among other
nonimmigrant visa holders, and highlights the availability of services for victims of
trafficking and exploitation).
158. See supra note 106.
159. Secure America and Orderly Immigration Act, S. 1033, 109th Cong. (2005).
Others included: Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007 (also known as the
Secure Borders, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Reform Act of 2007), S.
1348, 110th Cong. (2007); Security Through Regularized Immigration and a Vibrant
Economy Act of 2007 (STRIVE Act of 2007), H.R. 1645, 110th Cong. (2007); Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006 (CIRA), S. 2611, 109th Congress (2006).
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als was a large-scale unskilled guest worker program designed to control
future migrant flow.160 The guest worker programs were essentially the
same in each bill, with key worker safeguards, including, portability,161
stronger enforcement mechanisms,162 and a path to earned adjustment.163
It is likely that the guest worker component of any comprehensive immigration reform bill that will be proposed in the near future will resemble
these programs. While none of the bills became law, the Comprehensive
Immigration Reform Act of 2006 (CIRA 2006) progressed the furthest in
the legislative process in that it was passed by the Senate.164 For this reason, this discussion will center on CIRA 2006’s proposed H-2C guest
worker program.
The H-2C program would admit guest workers to perform nonagricultural jobs of a temporary or seasonal nature upon a showing by a petitioning employer that no qualified U.S. worker was available at the time
of need, and an employer attestation that the hire would not “adversely
affect the wages and working conditions” of similarly employed domestic
workers.165 While CIRA 2006 would wait on a job study to determine the
number of guest workers to be admitted,166 McCain-Kennedy proposed
the admission of 400,000 in the first year, with increases of 10 to 20 percent permitted in later years.167 Under the H-2C program, the initial visa
would be effective for a period of three years and could be extended for
another three years.168

160. See S. 1033, Title III; S. 2611, Title IV; S. 1348, Title IV; H.R. 1645, Title IV.
Notably, the H-2C program would not have been available to unauthorized immigrants as a means of adjusting their status. See S. 2611, § 403(f)(5). Similarly, from the
information thus far released about the framework for comprehensive immigration
reform now under consideration it does not seem that the guest worker program will
be designed to provide status to current unauthorized immigrants, but rather, will be
directed toward addressing the future flow of immigrants. See Charles E. Schumer &
Lindsey O. Graham, The Right Way to Mend Immigration, WASH. POST, Mar. 19,
2010, at A23; Peter Baker, Obama Exhorts Congress to Back Immigration Overhaul,
N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2010, at A12.
161. See S. 1033, § 302; H.R. 1645, § 402; S. 2611, § 403; S. 1348, § 403.
162. See S. 1033, § 304; H.R. 1645, § 403; S. 2611, § 404; S. 1348, § 404.
163. See S. 1033, § 306; H.R. 1645, § 407; S. 2611, § 408; S. 1348, § 408.
164. See Social Security Legislative Bulletin, Senate Passes S. 2611, SOCIAL SEC.
ONLINE, http://www.ssa.gov/legislation/legis_bulletin_062206.html (last visited June
29, 2011).
165. S. 2611, § 404(b)–(c).
166. Id. § 401.
167. S.1033, § 305(C)(i)–(ii). The STRIVE Act also proposed an initial 400,000
cap, which could be raised to 600,000, depending on demand. H.R. 1645, § 406(C)(i),
(iii).
168. S. 2611, § 403(f).
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H-2C employers would be required to pay the greater of the actual
wage rate for similarly situated employees of the employer or the prevailing wage level in the area of employment.169 Guest workers would also be
entitled to receive the same benefits as similarly situated employees and
the equivalent of workers’ compensation insurance, if not covered by the
state.170 Foreign labor contractors and recruiters would be prohibited
from collecting any fees from guest workers.171
1. Portability
To qualify for an H-2C visa, and to gain admission to the United
States, an H-2C worker would need to find an employer willing to hire
them, and petition for a visa.172 Once in the United States, an H-2C guest
worker would be able to change jobs if the subsequent employer was certified as being unable to find qualified domestic workers and the guest
worker could demonstrate that he or she had never worked without authorization.173 A guest worker’s H-2C status would terminate if the
worker was unemployed for sixty or more consecutive days, unless the
period of unemployment was due to medical problems, authorized leave,
or “any other period of temporary unemployment caused by circumstances beyond the [guest worker’s] control.”174
2. Government Oversight and Avenues for Complaint
By way of enforcement, CIRA 2006 directed the Secretary of Labor
to hire an additional 2000 compliance investigators annually to be dedicated to administering the guest worker program, “subject to the availability of appropriations for such purpose.”175 The H-2C program would
have featured a comprehensive administrative complaint system, while
also retaining the guest worker’s right to seek vindication of contractual
or statutory rights in other forums, like the courts.176 Under the system,
upon receipt of a complaint, the Secretary of Labor would either initiate
a hearing, or notify the aggrieved party that the U.S. DOL would not be
proceeding.177 The guest worker would then have a right to pursue an

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. § 404(b)(1)(B)(2).
Id. § 404(b)(2)(C).
Id. § 404(g)(4).
See id. § 403.
See id. § 403(j).
Id. § 403, § 218(A)(f)(3)(A)(2) (Senate engrossed version).
Id. § 303(a).
Id. § 404(h)(4).
Id. § 404(h)(4)(B).
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administrative hearing on his or her own initiative.178 CIRA 2006 did not
seem to provide for a means by which workers could remain in the
United States during the pendency of a labor claim.179
3. Path to Citizenship
The H-2C program would have provided two avenues for guest
workers to adjust their status to lawful permanent residents, placing them
on a path to citizenship. First, a guest worker could be sponsored for an
employment-based immigrant visa by his or her employer.180 Second, a
guest worker could self-sponsor upon a showing that: (1) the guest
worker had been employed as an H-2C worker for at least a cumulative
four years; (2) an employer attestation that it would employ the guest
worker; and (3) an attestation by the Secretary of Labor that there were
insufficient available domestic workers.181
IV. THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA
ISLANDS GUEST WORKER PROGRAM
The CNMI’s guest worker program employed many of the worker
safeguards that have been proposed in recent legislation—namely, visa
portability and a comprehensive, accessible administrative complaint system—with little success. As such, it offers useful evidence when considering a large-scale guest worker program as an element of immigration
reform. It also stands as a cautionary tale.
A. A Brief History of the CNMI
The CNMI comprises fourteen small islands in the Philippine Sea,
several of which are inhabited by little more than a few people.182 It is
located about 3,300 miles from Honolulu and 1,270 miles from Tokyo,183

178. See id. § 404(h)(4), (h)(8).
179. See id. § 404(h)(4) (failing to state whether and how a worker could stay in
the United States while waiting for his or her claim to be heard).
180. Id. § 408(h) (Senate engrossed version).
181. Id.
182. See Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF INSULAR AFFAIRS, http://www.doi.gov/oia/Islandpages/cnmipage
.htm (last visited May 7, 2011). The largest island, Saipan, is approximately 12 miles
long and 5 miles across. Saipan, WIKIPEDIA.COM, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saipan
(last updated June 15, 2011).
183. Id.
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and overall is home to about 46,000 people,184 approximately 16,000 of
whom are guest workers.185 Saipan, the largest and most populated island,
is best known as the site of a decisive WWII battle in 1944.186 Neighboring
Tinian was the launching site for the Enola Gay, which carried the atomic
bomb dropped on Hiroshima.187
After the war, the Northern Mariana Islands were administered by
the United States as part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, a
United Nations trusteeship.188 In the mid-1970s, the Northern Marianas
opted to become a Commonwealth of the United States and entered into
a covenant with the United States that governs the relationship.189 Under
the covenant, the CNMI was allowed to govern itself, but agreed to be
subject to most provisions of the U.S. Constitution and most federal laws,
with a few notable exceptions.190 In particular, until November 29, 2009,
when legislation went into effect federalizing the CNMI’s customs and
immigration system, the CNMI was not subject to U.S. Immigration and
Customs Laws.191 In addition, until June 2007, the CNMI was not covered
by the minimum-wage provisions of the FLSA.192 Under the covenant,
those born in the CNMI are U.S. citizens.193

184.

The World Factbook: The Northern Mariana Islands, CENTRAL INTELLIAGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/
cq.html (last updated Apr. 29, 2011).
185. REPORT ON THE ALIEN WORKER POPULATION IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF
THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS, SEC’Y OF THE INTERIOR ii (2010), available at
http://marianaslabor.net/news/DOI_Rpt_AlienWrkr_Pop-Apr_2010.pdf (estimating
that as of January 1, 2010, there were 20,859 aliens residing in the CNMI, of which
16,304 were alien workers).
186. See Battle of Saipan, HISTORYNET.COM (Aug. 31, 2006), http://www.history
net.com/battle-of-saipan.htm.
187. Tinian, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
facility/tinian.htm (last visited June 29, 2011).
188. HOWARD P. WILLENS & DEANNE C. SIEMER, AN HONORABLE ACCORD:
THE COVENANT BETWEEN THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS AND THE UNITED
STATES 4 (2002).
189. Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in
Political Union with the United States of America, PUB. L. NO. 94-241, 90 Stat.
263–264, § 101–102 (1976) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1801 note).
190. Id. §§ 102–105.
191. 48 U.S.C. § 1806(1)-(3) (2006) (Supp. 2010); infra note 195 (the law’s effective date was delayed 180 days to November 29, 2009).
192. Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, supra note 182.
193. 48 U.S.C. 1801, § 301(a) (2006).
GENCE
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B. Guest Workers
The CNMI began using guest workers during the trust territory period because it was deemed necessary in order to support economic development given the small size of the population.194 In 1983, the newly
formed Commonwealth enacted the Nonresident Workers Act, which remained in effect until January 1, 2008.195
The number of guest workers in the CNMI surged in the 1980s when
garment manufacturers from Hong Kong and Korea discovered that by
incorporating and setting up their businesses in the CNMI they could
avoid the U.S. quota system, which limited the number of garments foreign countries could sell in the United States.196 Also, the CNMI’s low
minimum wage and its guest worker program allowed manufacturers to
import workers from China and the Philippines, among other countries,
and pay them very low wages.197 At the height of the boom, in the year
2000, more than 36,000 guest workers were working in the CNMI198 (out
of a total population of about 69,221 at the time).199

194. See HOWARD P. WILLENS & DEANNE C. SIEMER, supra note 188, at 345–46;
357–59. In 1980, the population totaled 16,780. Id. at 361.
195. The Nonresident Workers Act, 1983 N. MAR. I. PUB. L. No. 3-66, was replaced by the Commonwealth Employment Act of 2007, 2007 N. MAR. I. PUB. L. NO.
15-108, effective Jan. 1, 2008. The Commonwealth Employment Act was effectively
rendered invalid on Nov. 29, 2009, by Title VII of the Consolidated Natural Resources Act of 2008 which extended U.S. immigration laws to the CNMI, thus displacing existing CNMI immigration laws. See PUB. L. NO. 110-229, 122 Stat. 853–67,
§§ 701–705 (codified at 48 U.S.C. §§ 1806, 1808). The law was scheduled to go into
effect on June 1, 2009, although the effective date was later delayed 180 days until
November 29, 2009. Press Release, Office of Homeland Sec’y, DHS Delays the Transition to Full Application of U.S. Immigration Laws in the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands (Mar. 31, 2009), http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/
pr_1238533954343.shtm (last visited June 29, 2011).
196. JOHN BOWE, NOBODIES: MODERN AMERICAN SLAVE LABOR AND THE
DARK SIDE OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 169 (2007).
197. Id. at 160–70.
198. See Conditions in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, supra
note 43, at 85–86 (Appendix 1). This estimate is based on the number of work permits
issued to alien workers in 2000 (36,261). Because aliens needed a work permit to
legally work in the CNMI, the number of permits issued closely approximated the
number of guest workers residing in the CNMI during that period. However, this
number did not include the number of temporary work permits issued, meaning that
there were likely several hundred to 1,000 more guest workers in the Commonwealth
in 2000. Id. at 86.
199. DONALD L. EVAN ET AL., 2000 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, THE
COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS 1–2 (2000), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/island/CNMIprofile.pdf.
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C. The Nonresident Workers’ Act
The Nonresident Workers’ Act (NWA) allowed aliens to temporarily enter the CNMI for employment purposes.200 The policy that drove
the NWA was the legislative finding that guest workers were “essential to
a balanced and stable economy in the Commonwealth” and necessary “at
the present state of economic development.”201 The law allowed guest
workers to perform almost any job (skilled or unskilled) with a few specific categories excluded.202 To be permitted to hire a guest worker, the
employer had to establish that no resident worker was available, that a
minimum percentage of employers’ workers were resident workers, and
that employment of a guest worker would not drive down wages of resident workers.203 Employment visas could be issued for no more than a
one-year period, but as a practical matter could be renewed indefinitely.204 The law did not provide guest workers a path to permanent resident status or citizenship.205
The employment of guest workers was highly regulated by the
CNMI government. To secure a visa, guest workers had to be hired by a
particular employer pursuant to a contract approved by the CNMI Department of Labor (CNMI DOL).206 To be approved, the employment
contract had to specify the hours and location of work, wages to be paid
for straight time and overtime work, and an itemized list of any deductions to be made.207 Further, any substantive changes to the contract had

200. See 3 N. MAR. I. CODE § 4411(a) (2004).
201. Id. § 4411(a).
202. See id. § 4434(e)(1)–(2), (h)(i) (guest workers could not be hired for most
governmental positions or for nongovernmental positions, such as taxicab drivers, secretaries, or bus drivers—to name a few).
203. See id. §§ 4411(b), 4413, 4433.
204. 26 N. MAR. I. REG. 22711–22713 (June 24, 2004). The NWA contains a fouryear cap on renewal. See 3 N. MAR. I. CODE § 4411(b). Notwithstanding the cap,
based on personal observations and experience it was rarely enforced.
205. Id. §§ 4411(b), 4437(a).
206. Id. § 4434. During the approximately 25 years that the NWA was in effect,
the name of the agency charged with administering it changed several times. For instance, for a period ending in 1994, the agency was called the Department of Labor
and Commerce, at which time it was renamed the Department of Labor and Immigration (DOLI). See CNMI Exec. Order 94-3 §§ 103, 301 (Aug. 23, 1994). Then, in 2003,
the agency was restructured and renamed the Department of Labor. See CNMI Exec.
Order No. 03-01 § 101(d) (Mar. 10, 2003). Notwithstanding the name changes, the
agency’s functions under the NWA did not change significantly. For the sake of clarity, I will simply refer to the agency as the CNMI Department of Labor (CNMI DOL)
throughout this article.
207. Id. § 4433(g).
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to be approved by the Director of Labor.208 The NWA also required employers to: pay guest workers the minimum wage for the occupational
category;209 cover all medical expenses (not just work-related expenses);210
cover all expenses associated with work visas;211 and cover the transportation costs to the CNMI and back to the employee’s point of origin.212
Employers were also prohibited from terminating guest workers’ employment without cause.213 The law also required employers to purchase a
bond ensuring the employer’s performance of its obligations,214 including
the payment of back wages,215 medical bills,216 and repatriation costs in the
event of insolvency.217
1. Portability
The NWA provided guest workers with three ways to “transfer” to a
new employer. First, a guest worker was afforded forty-five days to find a
new employer at the end of the contract.218 Second, a guest worker could
transfer mid-contract upon the consent of both the original contracting
employer and the new employer and the CNMI DOL.219 Finally, a guest
worker could gain the right to transfer by administrative order upon a
finding by an administrative law judge that the employer had committed
a violation of the NWA, had closed the business, terminated the worker
without cause, or because of other specified grounds.220
2. Government Oversight and Accessible Avenues for Complaint
The CNMI DOL had broad authority to monitor employers of guest
workers and to enforce the provisions of the NWA, the Commonwealth
Minimum Wage and Hour Law, and the terms of guest workers’ nonresi208. Id. §§ 4434(d), 4437(d).
209. Id. § 4437(b).
210. Id. § 4437(c).
211. Id. § 4424(a)(5).
212. See id. § 4435(a); 26 N. MAR. I. REG. 22708 (June 24, 2004).
213. See 26 N. MAR. I. REG. 22733–22734 (providing guidelines for notice of termination with cause and subsequently requiring review of termination by the CNMI
DOL to ensure the reasons for termination complied with relevant contract
provisions).
214. 3 N. MAR. I. CODE § 4435(a).
215. 26 N. MAR. I. REG. 22708 (requiring that the bond be sufficient to cover six
months wages, repatriation costs, $10,000 for medical costs, and $5,000 for embalming
and repatriation costs in the event of the worker’s death).
216. Id. § 4437(c).
217. Id. § 4435(a).
218. Id. § 4602(b).
219. Id. § 4602(a).
220. See id. § 4444(e)(5); 26 N. MAR. I. REG. 22742.
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dent worker contracts.221 Specifically, the CNMI DOL was authorized to
inspect worksites and employer-provided housing and to review payroll
records and records related to workers illnesses and injuries.222 During
the years 2001 through 2006, the CNMI DOL Health and Safety Unit
conducted more than 1,000 worksite inspections, and a few hundred inspections of employee housing, each year.223 During this same period,
however, unannounced regulatory inspections were very rare due to the
invalidation of some of the regulatory inspection provisions of the NWA
by a federal district court in February 2000.224 Corrective legislation was
enacted, but proved to be overly restrictive, largely curtailing the authorities’ ability to conduct inspections.225
The NWA also created an accessible administrative complaint system, which allowed guest workers (and employers) to file complaints with
the CNMI DOL for a contract violation.226 Complaints ran the gamut,
from allegations of forced prostitution, to unpaid wages, recruitment
scams, and claims of being confined in employee barracks during nonworking hours.227 A complaint could be initiated either by the local CNMI
DOL, or by a worker or employer.228
In the case of worker-initiated complaints, the complaint could take
the form of a short, handwritten description of the problem.229 The filing
costs for such a complaint were $20.230 While an attorney was not required
221. See 3 N. MAR. I. CODE §§ 4421, 4437(d)(j)(k); Commonwealth Minimum
Wage and Hour Act, 4 N. MAR. I. CODE § 9231.
222. See 3 N. MAR. I. CODE § 4437(d) (requiring an employer’s application for
renewal of a nonresident certificate to include evidence of payment of the employee’s
monthly taxes, quarterly tax revenues, and a copy of the employee’s 1040 tax form);
id. § 4421 (allowing the CNMI DOL to “oversee, monitor, and review the use of nonresident workers and all matters related to such use, including the health, safety,
meals, lodging, salaries, and working hours and conditions of such workers”).
223. Conditions in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, supra
note 43, at 96.
224. See JIM BENEDETTO, FEDERAL OMBUDSMAN’S REPORT ON THE STATUS OF
NONRESIDENT WORKERS IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS: CURRENT CONDITIONS, ISSUES AND TRENDS IN THE CNMI 16 (2006), http://
www.doi.gov/oia/reports/OmbudsmansReport.pdf (citing Gorromeo v. Zachares, No.
99-0018 (D. N. Mar. I. 2000)).
225. Id.
226. 3 N. MAR. I. CODE § 4447(b).
227. See BENEDETTO, supra note 225, at 27 n.14; Reich v. Japan Enters. Corp.,
Nos. 94-17151, 95-15074, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 17677, at *16–17 (9th Cir. July 10,
1996) (affirming awards of compensation for nonworking hours where the plaintiffs
were confined to the employer’s barracks).
228. See 26 N. MAR. I. REG. 22747, 22752–53 (June 24, 2004).
229. 26 N. MAR. I. REG. 22747.
230. 26 N. MAR. I. REG. 22748.
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for the administrative proceedings, the NWA provided for attorneys fees
for a guest worker who prevailed in an administrative proceeding.231 The
federal ombudsman of the U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of Insular Affairs, who assists guest workers with labor and immigration complaints, would provide translators for a guest worker, if needed.232 A
worker could also seek administrative review of the hearing officer’s decision and subsequent judicial review.233 Finally, a worker unable to collect
on an administrative or court order awarding back wages who was ready
to leave the CNMI could assign his or her right to collect on the order to
the CNMI DOL, and it would front the worker up to three months of
back wages and a plane ticket to the worker’s point of hire.234
During the period 2000–2006, there were on average thirteen CNMI
DOL investigators on staff,235 and a labor force of approximately
42,750,236 which translated into approximately one investigator for every
3,900 workers. In addition, there were three hearing officers permanently
assigned to the CNMI DOL to handle labor matters.237 Generally an assistant attorney general was also assigned.238 The hearing officers and the
Secretary of Labor had broad authority to award back pay and liquidated
damages,239 and to bar serious offenders from further hiring of guest
workers.240 As of May 2011, the CNMI had approximately 190 employers
on its barred list, many of whom have been permanently barred from
employing guest workers.241
A tremendous number of labor complaints were filed by guest
workers and some by employers. In addition, some were initiated by the

231. 3 N. MAR. I. CODE § 4447(d).
232. See WENDY R. GINSBERG & FREDERICK M. KAISER, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL 34606, FEDERAL COMPLAINT-HANDLING, OMBUDSMAN, AND ADVOCACY
OFFICES 33, n.137 (2009).
233. Id. §§ 4445, 4446.
234. Commonwealth Nonresident Worker Relief Act of 1999, N. MAR. I. PUB. L.
11-66 no.
235. Conditions in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, supra
note 43, at 104 (Appendix 1).
236. Id. at 89 (Appendix 1) (this number represents the entire labor force in 2000,
not just employees under the CNMI DOL’s jurisdiction, which would be a lesser number; thus, the ratio of investigators to covered workers was actually higher).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See 3 N. MAR. I. CODE § 4447(d).
240. See id. § 4444.
241. Barred Employers, CNMI DEP’T OF LABOR, https://marianaslabor.net/
barred.asp (last visited May 13, 2011). It remains to be seen whether the U.S. DOL
will honor this list as it takes over administration of the guest worker program applying federal law.
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CNMI DOL. Specifically, from 2000–2006, 200 to 800 complaints regarding working conditions were filed each year, and in 2006 and 2007, there
were approximately 400 complaints objecting to denials of requests for
labor permits or transfers.242 Some of these cases involved numerous complainants and required time-intensive investigations.243 As a result of the
high volume of cases, and an inadequate number of trained experienced
investigators, the administrative system was overwhelmed with a backlog
of cases.244 In 2007, more than 3000 cases dating from 1996–2004 were
pending.245
In the early 1990s, the CNMI Supreme Court issued a number of
decisions that established that guest workers alleging any infringement on
their right to life, liberty, or property, including a claim of unpaid wages,
had a due process right to remain in the Commonwealth until afforded a
hearing.246 In response to these decisions, the CNMI DOL began holding
mediation sessions after a worker filed a complaint, and if the complaint
was deemed non-frivolous and one that arguably warranted that the employee cease working for the contract employer, the DOL would grant

242. See Conditions in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, supra
note 43, at 96 (Appendix 1); Ferdie de la Torre, Labor Cases Piling Up Anew, SAIPAN
TRIB., Oct. 19, 2007, http://www.saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?cat=1&newsID=
73442 (reporting that in 2006, 358 labor cases were filed and 441 denial case applications appealed, and as of October 2007, 280 labor cases had been filed and 400 denial
case applications appealed).
243. See Conditions in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, supra
note 43, at 96–97 (Appendix 1) (discussing “compliance agency cases,” which were
initiated by the CNMI DOL and generally were more complex, as they involved multiple workers).
244. See BENEDETTO, supra note 225, at 9.
245. Ferdie de la Torre, Over 3,000 Backlog in Labor Cases Eliminated, SAIPAN
TRIB., Mar. 21, 2007, http://www.saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?cat=1&newsID=
66720; see also Liberty Dones, DOLI: Aging Labor Cases Under Review, SAIPAN
TRIB., Nov. 23, 2002 http://www.saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?cat=1&newsID=
24189 (describing the CNMI’s Department of Labor and Immigration review of old
pending cases that had, as of 2002, been at the courts for years).
246. See, e.g., Office of the Attorney Gen. v. Deala, 3 N. Mar. I. 110, 116 (1992)
(holding that “[i]n an administrative proceeding where a person’s life, liberty, or
property is at stake, Article I, § 5 of the Commonwealth Constitution requires, at a
minimum, that the person be accorded meaningful notice and a meaningful opportunity to a hearing, appropriate to the nature of the case”); Office of the Attorney Gen.
v. Rivera, 3 N. Mar. I. 436, 445 (1993) ( “[A]n order of deportation, while a valid wage
claim is pending, must be stayed until, at the very least, the worker is provided a
meaningful opportunity to a hearing . . . . the opportunity for a hearing cannot be
meaningful when a worker is required to leave the island and then return for a hearing and it is undisputed that the worker has no financial means to return.”).
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the employee a temporary work permit to seek work elsewhere during
the pendency of the case.247
This due process right, combined with the tremendous backlog of
cases, meant that many workers were authorized to remain in the CNMI
without formal employment while awaiting a labor hearing, often for
years.248 This created a large pool of available workers, at times exceeding
1,500 workers (out of a guest worker pool of 25,000 to 35,000), who were
authorized to work on a temporary three-month basis and available to
change jobs at the end of each contract period, or who were unemployed,
but authorized to seek temporary work.249 Some of these workers ended
up working illegally, without a long-term or short-term contract, which
meant that they were not afforded the same protections as guest workers
under contract (such as health benefits or bonds to cover wages and repatriation costs in the case of employer insolvency), and in some cases were
paid even lower wages than those working lawfully.250
3. Abuses of CNMI Guest Workers Were Commonplace Along with
Depressed Wages
The CNMI’s guest worker program gained worldwide notoriety in
the 1990s when reports of horrid sweatshop conditions and widespread
abuse of the guest workers began to surface.251 Its notoriety was renewed

247. 26 N. MAR. I. REG. 22756 (June 24, 2004).
248. See BENEDETTO, supra note 225, at 19–20.
249. See Conditions in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, supra
note 43, at 102 (Appendix 1) (stating that during a three-month period there were
generally 1,500 temporary work authorizations (TWA) in effect, along with some unspecified number of guest workers holding a memo authorizing them to seek a TWA,
but who had not yet found work).
250. See id.; BENEDETTO, supra note 225, at 19–20; Ferdie de la Torre, Arrested
workers not paid the hourly rate; briefed on escape, SAIPAN TRIB., Apr. 29, 2006, http://
www.saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?cat=1&newsID=57073; Ferdie de la Torre, 57
workers are awarded $.4M, SAIPAN TRIB., Oct. 15, 2006, http://www.saipantribune.
com/newsstory.aspx?newsID=62051&cat=1 (reporting that 57 guest workers, many of
whom did not have an approved contract, were not paid at all for months at a time,
and that the back wages would be hard to collect because the employer, who had
since fled the Commonwealth, had not posted bonds with the DOL to cover the workers’ wages because the workers were working illegally).
251. See Scott L. Cummings, Hemmed In: Legal Mobilization in the Los Angeles
Anti-Sweatshop Movement, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 77 (2009) (describing a
nonprofit’s (Sweatshop Watch) efforts to internationalize “the legal struggle against
sweatshops by targeting producers in Saipan” where goods could be exported as
“duty-free while being exempt from labor laws”); Robyn Plummer, Sweatshops, made
in the good, old U.S.A., ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 29, 2006, at 5P (describing efforts by Jack Abramoff and influential Republican leaders to prevent a U.S. Depart-
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during the Jack Abramoff scandal because Abramoff had been the principal lobbyist for the Northern Marianas, hired to head efforts by the federal government to prevent the extension of U.S. labor laws to the
CNMI.252 Some of the worst abuses of the 1990s were resolved by three
landmark class-action lawsuits that were filed against some of the biggest
names in the apparel industry, including The Gap, Calvin Klein, Liz Claiborne, Sears, and Nordstrom.253 Ultimately, the defendants agreed to a
settlement that required them to pay the workers more than $20 million,
and submit to ongoing monitoring.254 Also during this period, the U.S.
DOL imposed its largest fine ever ($9 million in wage restitution), on
garment magnate Willie Tan for the wages garment workers in his Saipan
factories were still owed.255 Notwithstanding these large settlements and
the introduction of independent monitoring at the large garment factories, the number of labor abuses continued to be significant.256
Specifically, instances of wage theft were common.257 Over a tenmonth period in fiscal year 2005, the federal ombudsman referred 701
employee cases to federal and local agencies. Most of the complaints involved nonpayment of wages, breach of contract, wrongful termination,
national origin discrimination, nonpayment of overtime, and illegal dement of the Interior official, Allen Stayman, from helping exploited immigrant
workers in the CNMI).
252. Controversial Lobbyist Had Close Contact with Bush Team, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, May 7, 2005, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-0506-abramoff-bush_x.htm (reporting that in the first ten months of the Bush administration, Abramoff and his team had nearly 200 contacts with administration officials
regarding the CNMI and its interest in maintaining the Commonwealth’s exemption
from minimum wage laws).
253. See Cummings, supra note 251, at 77–78 (suits were brought in California as
well as the CNMI); Doe I v. Gap, Inc., No. CV-01-0031, 2001 WL 1842389, at *6, 22
(D. N. Mar. I. Nov. 26, 2001) (among claims alleged were involuntary servitude and
violation of the right of freedom of association and the right to be free from discrimination, rights alleged to be protected under international law and actionable under
the Alien Tort Claims Act).
254. Cummings, supra note 251, at 78 (citing Jenny Strasburg, Saipan Lawsuit
Terms OKd: Garment Workers to Get $20 Million, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 25, 2003, at B1.
255. BOWE, supra note 196, at 174.
256. See BENEDETTO, supra note 225, at 27, 27 n.14 (concluding that while labor
conditions had improved significantly in the CNMI since the late 1990s “complaints of
illegal recruitment scams and non-payment of wages [were] still prevalent”).
257. See, e.g., 151 Filipino Workers Get $500,000 in Back Wages, SAIPAN TRIB.,
July 16, 2008, http://www.saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?cat=1&newsID=81685;
Garment firm pays $238K in back wages, SAIPAN TRIB., Nov. 6, 2004, http://www.
saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?newsID=41723&cat=1; Tinian Dynasty ordered to
pay $591K in back wages, SAIPAN TRIB., Oct. 6, 2002, http://www.saipantribune.com/
newsstory.aspx?cat=1&newsID=22895.
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ductions from paychecks.258 Unhygienic and inhumane working conditions in factories and barracks were also widespread.259 In one notorious
case in 1999, 1,200 workers were sickened by food poisoning from food
served to them by a factory cafeteria.260
Instances of discrimination were also numerous. In 2005, the regional attorney for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s
(EEOC) district office that covers the Northern Marianas expressed concern about the “extraordinarily high number of charges alleging unlawful
terminations based on national origin and various forms of sex discrimination, including harassment against women.”261 He also characterized
the discrimination as “blatant and clearly intentional.”262 In 2009, the
EEOC reached a $1.7 million settlement with a group of garment manufacturers resolving a series of lawsuits that involved claims of retaliation
and pregnancy, age, and national origin discrimination.263 One employer
acknowledged that it segregated Filipino workers and Chinese workers
during the work day and at lunch because, according to the employer, this
“promoted a harmonious work environment.”264 Human and sex traffick-

258. Feds Note Disturbing Labor Cases in CNMI, PACIFIC ISLAND NEWS SERNov. 10, 2005.
259. See Federal Law Enforcement and the Use of Federal Funds in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands Before the H. Comm. on Nat. Res., 106th
Cong. 4 (1999) (statement of John Berry, Assistant Secretary for Policy, Management,
& Budget, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior), available at http://naturalresources.house.gov/
UploadedFiles/John_berry_testimony_916.99.pdf (describing three instances of food
poisoning in a garment factory that had sickened hundreds of workers); Schloss, supra
note 33 (reporting that “[f]lies buzz[ed] around diners in the canteen where dishes
were not washed properly” and that the workers refused to eat the food).
260. See Ron Harris, OSHA: Massive Food Poisoning Outbreak at Saipan Garment Factory, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 7, 1999, available at http://www.global
exchange.org/campaigns/sweatshops/saipan/harris040899.html. A regional administrator of the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Frank
Strasheim, described the scene as “a battle zone. People were lying on the ground
with IVs sticking out of them,” and noted that in his 28 years at OSHA he had “never
seen a food poisoning case of this magnitude.” Id.
261. Feds note disturbing labor cases in CNMI, PACIFIC ISLAND NEWS SERVICE,
Nov. 10, 2005.
262. Id.
263. Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm., Largest Garment
Manufacturers in Saipan to Pay $1.7 in Landmark Discrimination Settlement with
EEOC (July 28, 2009), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/7-2809.cfm.
264. Id.; see also Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm., EEOC
Obtains Million Dollar Judgment Against Saipan Garment Contractor Sako Corp.
(Apr. 25, 2005), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/4-25-05.html (reporting that
the EEOC had won a $1 million judgment against Sako Corp., a garment factory
VICE,
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ing were (and continue to be) prevalent in the CNMI. According to U.S.
State Department estimates in 2007, human trafficking was reported as
occurring at least 8.8 to 10.6 times more frequently in the Northern Marianas than in the United States as a whole.265
Finally, wages in the CNMI were markedly low and jobs sharply
demarcated as “guest worker” and citizen. The minimum wage in the
Northern Marianas did not exceed the $2.00 mark until 1984, and did not
rise above $3.00 until 1995, when it was raised to $3.05 per hour.266 It
stayed at that rate until June 2007, when federal legislation increased it.267
When compared to the federal minimum wage and median wages paid in
neighboring Guam, wages in the Northern Marianas have been woefully
slow to increase both for skilled and unskilled workers alike.268 With most
private sector salaries depressed, many U.S. citizens of the CNMI seek
work in the public sector, where wages tend to be higher than in the private sector.269 In the private sector, nearly all jobs involving manual labor,
domestic services, restaurant work, or garment manufacturing, continue

based in Saipan, for discrimination when it failed to renew the contracts of 100 longtime Filipino, Thai, and Bangladeshi guest workers, allegedly for business necessity,
and replaced them with less-experienced Chinese nationals; the employer had only
five years earlier settled two lawsuits with the EEOC, one alleging pregnancy discrimination, and another, retaliation).
265. The Northern Mariana Islands Covenant Implementation Act Before the S.
Comm. on Energy and Natural Res., 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of David B. Cohen, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for the Office of Insular Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior), available at http://www.doi.gov/oia/press/2007/07192007.html (according to
Cohen, this is an “apples-to-apples comparison, the CNMI’s report card would be
worse,” because U.S. State Department numbers are based on estimates, and the
CNMI numbers are based on identified cases; for the period April 30, 2006, to April
30, 2007, 36 identified victims of human trafficking, out of a CNMI population of approximately 70,000. In contrast, the State Department estimates that 14,500 to 17,500
people are trafficked into the United States, out of a population of roughly 300
million).
266. 4 N. MAR. I. CODE § 9221 (2004) and accompanying Commission Comment.
267. PUB. L. NO. 111-24, § 2(a), 124 Stat. 2618 (making the Fair Labor Standards
Act, which includes minimum wage requirements, applicable in the CNMI).
268. See Memorandum from Charles Cepeda, Alex Sablan & Josephine Mesta,
Co-chairs of the Jobs Study Comm. in the CNMI Office of the Public Auditor, to
Michael Sablan 14–15 (May 30, 2007), available at http://www.wia.gov.mp/downloads/
OPA_Job_Study_Report.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum from the Jobs Study Comm.]
(advocating using Guam’s median wage as means for increasing the CNMI’s median
and minimum wage rates).
269. Conditions in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, supra
note 43, at 10 (statement of David B. Cohen, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for the Office of
Insular Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior).
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to be held by foreign workers.270 In addition, many skilled jobs have also
become “guest worker” jobs; this includes accountant positions, general
managers, masons, carpenters, and automotive mechanics.271
The very safeguards designed to protect guest workers, namely, the
right to transfer, the accessible complaint system, and the due process
right to remain in the CNMI pending a hearing, combined with inadequate resources allocated to the CNMI DOL to administer the program,
led to a second tier of abuses and scams related to the guest worker program. Namely, there emerged a spate of sham employment arrangements
in which unemployed guest workers, desperate to remain in the CNMI,
paid local businesses and individuals to pose as their employer to maintain their immigration status.272 Then the guest worker could remain in
the CNMI and continue searching for a real employer (one intending to
provide the guest worker with work) and seek a consensual transfer to
the new employer.273 There were also instances in which unemployed
guest workers, coming to the end of the forty-five day “transfer” period,
would file frivolous complaints knowing that this would very likely buy
them a significant amount of time—often years—to remain in the CNMI
given the tremendous backlog of labor cases.274 While these arrangements
allowed guest workers to remain in the CNMI, it also left them even

270. See Memorandum from the Jobs Study Comm., supra note 268, at 3.
271. Id. (listing these occupations among several that are primarily filled by nonresident workers).
272. See Conditions in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, supra
note 43, at 49–50 (testimony of Jim Benedetto, Federal Ombudsman) (describing the
prevalence of these illegal sponsorships); Id. at 62 (testimony of Lauri Ogumoro, a
social worker with Karidat, a Catholic Social Services Agency in the CNMI) (describing one case in which a woman paid $2,000 to a “sponsor” who then ran away with her
money without sponsoring her).
273. Id. at 50 (testimony of Jim Benedetto, Federal Ombudsman). These same
kinds of sponsorships have also been observed by guest worker advocates under the
H-2 programs. See Workers Pay up to $5,000 for Post-Katrina Hotel Jobs, S. POVERTY
LAW CTR. (Apr. 2007), available at http://www.splcenter.org/publications / close - to slavery-guestworker - programs - in - the - united - states / recruitment - exploitation - be - 1
(describing a scheme where employers would lure guest workers to the United States
with offers of eight to ten months of work, but would actually provide only two to
three months of work, and then advise the workers to seek work elsewhere).
274. See Conditions in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, supra
note 43, at 44–45 (statement of Timothy P. Villagomez, Lieutenant Governor of the
CNMI) (describing the numerous “copycat” cases filed by guest workers in 2003 and
2004, so named because many of the complaints filed were identical).
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more vulnerable to exploitation, with some guest workers likely becoming prostitutes to support themselves while unemployed.275
V. THE EVIDENCE IS UNEQUIVOCAL: A MCCAINKENNEDY–STYLE GUEST WORKER PROGRAM WILL NOT
SERVE THE STATED AIMS OF IMMIGRATION REFORM
Cornell University labor economist Vernon Briggs began his testimony before a 2004 Senate committee, which was considering the introduction of a large-scale guest worker program as a means to help combat
unauthorized immigration, by noting that this idea had been periodically
raised over the last thirty years.276 He then summarized his view of this
approach with the words: “It is a bad idea that just will not go away.”277
The CNMI example lends further support to this position, and provides
evidence establishing that even with the safeguards of portability and an
accessible administrative complaint system, such a program would likely
spawn myriad abuses, drive down wages, and damage democracy. The
evidence from the CNMI suggests that this would be the case even with
the added ingredient of a path for adjustment to permanent immigration
status of the kind envisioned in the McCain-Kennedy bill. This evidence
should not be ignored.
A. Portability Will Not Protect Guest Workers from Abuse So Long as
Their Immigration Status Is Tied to Continued Employment
The NWA provided CNMI guest workers the right to freely transfer
to other employers at the end of their contract, by consensual transfer
mid-contract, or at the conclusion of an administrative hearing, so long as

275. See TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2010, OFFICE TO MONITOR & COMTRAFFICKING, UNITED STATES DEP’T OF STATE 344 (June 2010), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/142979.pdf (describing reports from the
Federal Labor Ombudsman in the CNMI that documented claims of foreign women
forced into prostitution); Conditions in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands, supra note 43, at 10 (statement of David B. Cohen, Deputy Assistant Sec’y
for the Office of Insular Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior) (citing reports that laidoff garment workers are turning to prostitution).
276. Guestworker Programs for Low-Skilled Workers: Lessons from the Past and
Warnings for the Future, supra note 72, at 44; see also Protecting U.S. and Guest Workers: The Recruitment and Employment of Temporary Foreign Labor, supra note 66, at
52 (statement of Jonathan P. Hiatt, General Counsel, AFL-CIO) (stating that the
“United States has been experimenting with temporary worker programs for almost a
century, without a single success”).
277. Guestworker Programs for Low-Skilled Workers: Lessons from the Past and
Warnings for the Future, supra note 72, at 44.
BAT

R

R
R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\41-1\NMX103.txt

Spring 2011]

unknown

Seq: 45

GUEST WORKER PROGRAMS

7-NOV-11

14:01

175

they were not unemployed for more than forty-five days (or, in the case
of an administrative transfer, however many days the hearing officer allowed the worker to find another employer).278 Arguably, the relative independence provided CNMI guest workers should have protected them
from abuse. In fact, most workers remained reliant on their original employers because all transfer options ultimately rested upon the willingness
of another employer to officially hire the employee within a set period of
time.279
A H-2C–type visa would provide guest workers with portability on
similar terms. Namely, an H-2C worker, who must initially be petitioned
for by a specific employer, would be free to change employers, but only if
the worker could secure employment with a certified employer within
sixty days of becoming unemployed.280 Judging from the CNMI example,
portability to a limited number of employers under strict time constraints
would likely not decrease guest workers’ reliance on their sponsoring employers by a significant degree because meeting these conditions would
be far from certain, particularly if the guest workers worked in remote
locations and had limited access to transportation. The potential for
earned adjustment and its requirement of employer sponsorship or continuous employment for four years281 would arguably make many guest
workers even more motivated to either remain with their original employer, no matter the circumstances, or find a new employer, no matter
the costs. As such, it is easy to imagine how the combination of portability, with limitations, and earned adjustment, with conditions, could lead
to a whole new category of abuses, likely of the type experienced in the
CNMI.

278. See 3 N. MAR. I. CODE § 4602(a)–(b), (g) (2004); 26 N. MAR. I. REG. 22742
(June 24, 2004).
279. Id. In the case of a consensual transfer, the worker must receive consent
from both the current and prospective employer and the CNMI DOL. Id. § 4602(a).
To transfer at the end of a contract, the guest worker must secure new employment
within 45 days or depart the Commonwealth. Id. § 4602(b). In the absence of the
employer’s abandonment, insolvency, or destruction of its business establishment, to
be eligible for an administrative transfer, the employee must prevail in an administrative proceeding, and then must secure new employment, generally within forty five
days, although it was left to the discretion of the hearing officer. 3 N. MAR. I. CODE
§ 4444(e)(5) (2004); 26 N. MAR. I. REG. 22742.
280. See supra notes 172–74 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 180–81 and accompanying text.
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B. Improved Administrative Oversight and Accessible Avenues for
Pursuing Worker Complaints Are Unlikely to End Abuse of Guest
Workers
While the CNMI DOL did not engage in significant proactive enforcement efforts, the administrative complaint system available to guest
workers under the NWA was accessible, easy to navigate, comprehensive,
and generally accompanied by a right to remain and work in the CNMI
for the duration of the case.282 The downside to the accessibility of the
complaint process and the nearly automatic protection from deportation
was that it led to a tremendous number of cases being filed, including a
large number of frivolous cases motivated by a wish to remain in the
CNMI.283 This, in turn, led to a monumental backlog of cases and a large
pool of under-employed or unemployed guest workers available to be
hired on a temporary basis (or “off the books”).284 Considerable resources were diverted from policing and preventing serious labor abuses
to closing “old” cases and aiding guest workers under temporary work
authorization.285
Notably, the H-2C program would include a comprehensive administrative complaint system that resembles the CNMI system.286 While it is
unclear how effective or accessible such a program would be, if implemented, it is notable that it was to be carried out by the U.S. DOL’s
WHD. Currently, H-2A and H-2B workers possess a theoretical right to
file a work-related complaint with their local wage and hour division of
the U.S. DOL.287 However, as discussed previously, this process is largely
ineffective, in part, because U.S. DOL offices are often far from guest
workers’ place of employment,288 and because there are far too few investigators to handle what are often time-intensive cases.289 Additionally, the
DOL’s WHD is already failing in its duty to protect low-wage workers
already in the country from wage theft and thus is certainly not equipped
to protect an influx of tens of thousands of vulnerable guest workers.290
To judge from the experience of the CNMI, a very high investigator-toworker ratio is needed to effectively and justly administer a large-scale
guest worker program. Just to reach the DOL investigator-to-worker ra-

282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
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notes 226–34 and accompanying text.
notes 242–45, 274 and accompanying text.
notes 248–50 and accompanying text.
notes 242–45 and accompanying text.
notes 175–79 and accompanying text.
Part III.C.2.
note 125 and accompanying text.
notes 133–38 and accompanying text.
notes 128–32, 150 and accompanying text.
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tio that existed in the CNMI DOL of 1 to 3900,291 the U.S. DOL would
have to hire approximately 18,588 additional investigators to its current
workforce of 949 investigators.292 Given this ratio proved to be woefully
insufficient in the CNMI, the number would have to be significantly
greater to combat and prevent widespread abuses. In addition, to meet
the CNMI’s ratio of approximately three hearing officers for 25,000 guest
workers,293 the U.S. DOL would need to hire at least forty-eight hearing
officers to cover a guest worker workforce of 400,000.294
With the current trend of declining funding levels for agencies
charged with enforcing federal minimum wage and hour and workplace
safety laws over the last three decades, particularly funding to the U.S.
DOL WHD,295 it seems unlikely that the government would allocate sufficient resources to effectively and fairly enforce a new guest worker program. This is particularly likely given that officials seem to underestimate
the extent to which guest worker programs need to be closely policed in
order to prevent exploitation and abuses. For instance, in testimony
before Congress in 2004, the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) argued
that the establishment of a temporary worker program would free up
DHS personnel from attending to “problems with unlawful workers.”296
Unlike the CNMI guest worker program, the H-2C program contains no mechanism which would allow complaining guest workers to remain in the United States to pursue a labor complaint during its pendency
if their visa had expired.297 It appears that H-2C workers, like H-2A and

291. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
292. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. Even assuming that the comparison with the CNMI is imperfect because many of the CNMI’s investigators lacked the
education and training that U.S. investigators would likely receive, there is no doubt
that the U.S. DOL would still have to hire thousands of investigators to provide adequate oversight over a large-scale guest worker program.
293. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (the H-2C program would admit
400,000 workers in its first year).
295. Rebuilding a Good Jobs Economy: A Blueprint for Recovery and Reform,
NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT 10 (Nov. 2008), available at http://nelp.3cdn.net/
107e65168f65eacd6e_l1m6ibpdr.pdf) (reporting that “[b]etween 1980 and 2007, the
number of wage and hour inspectors declined by 31 percent (from 1,059 to 732) and
the number of enforcement actions fell by 61 percent (from 76,452 to 29,584). By
contrast, the civilian labor force grew by 52 percent during this same time period.”).
296. Hearing Evaluating a Temporary Guest Worker Program, supra note 5, at 18
(statement of Asa Hutchinson, Under Secretary for Border & Transportation Security, Dep’t of Homeland Security).
297. See supra note 174 and accompanying text (a H-2C’s legal immigration status would terminate after sixty days of unemployment).
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H-2B workers, would have to roll the dice with the USCIS on a case-bycase basis and hope that it would grant deferred action.
If a McCain-Kennedy–style administrative complaint system ends
up being inaccessible and under-resourced, then it is likely that a new
class of guest workers would be as vulnerable to abuses as today’s H-2
workers. In addition, if it does not include a transparent and dependable
process for granting deferred action, only the most desperate guest workers are likely to complain about unlawful employer practices, particularly
when the possibility of earned adjustment hangs in the balance. On the
other hand, if the system is well-resourced, offices are located close to
where guest workers live and work, and guest workers are allowed to
remain in the United States while pursuing complaints, then, based on the
CNMI example, the U.S. DOL should be prepared to receive an avalanche of complaints—both legitimate and illegitimate.298 This is because,
as is well documented in the case of the H-2 programs and the CNMI
program, many employers will cheat and abuse their guest workers. If
there is an effective and fair administrative complaint system, guest workers will likely use it in great numbers, often with legitimate complaints. In
addition, some guest workers, desperate to make money to provide for
their families, to repay employment-related debts, and to gain citizenship,
will game the system with frivolous complaints to try to remain in the
country if they find themselves out of work with the sixty-day deadline
approaching.299
C. A Path to Citizenship That Must Be “Earned” by Means of
Continuous Employment Would Not End Guest Worker Abuses
Unlike a McCain-Kennedy–style program, the CNMI guest worker
program offered no possibility for earned adjustment.300 This possibility
represents a significant change from past and present federal guest
worker programs and arguably, a material difference from the CNMI example. Indeed, such a possibility might resolve any potential for the program to look, in the words of philosopher Michael Walzer, like a

298. See supra notes 242–45 (describing the large number of complaints against
employers in the CNMI).
299. See, e.g., supra note 274 and accompanying text (describing a practice of
unemployed nonresident workers in the CNMI who would as they approach the end
of the forty-five day transfer period, file a frivolous complaint as an attempt to try to
stay in the CNMI pending a hearing for the complaint).
300. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
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“tyranny” insofar as the state would not be creating a caste that permanently bars a group that looks exactly like citizens from citizenship.301
However, as proposed, earned adjustment seems destined to exacerbate the power imbalance between guest workers and employers. What is
more, such a proposal would more sharply define guest workers as a caste
separate and apart from the rest. This will be the case so long as earned
adjustment is dependent at all on continued employment with some employer, because guest workers who seek to become citizens will be all the
more likely to silently endure abuse and exploitation to achieve the
dream of citizenship. Guest worker proposals of earned adjustment have
already been described as “a formal category of residents who must earn
the right to . . . apply for a green card through years of hard manual labor,” which according to some is “unprecedented in U.S. history and inimical to this country’s professed tradition of equality and citizenship
without tiers.”302 As proposed, guest workers are expected and required
to labor quietly and without complaint if they want to be certain to earn
the right to move from the caste of laborers to that of a long-term permanent resident and eventual citizen. Any misstep or poor turn of luck can
lead to the abrupt end to the dream of citizenship.
D. Limitations of the Evidence
There are certainly some limits to the evidence presented by the
CNMI. The most significant distinctions are the high proportion of guest
workers to permanent residents in the CNMI, where at times nearly 50
percent of the population is guest workers, and, similarly, the CNMI’s
overwhelming reliance on a foreign labor force.303 In contrast, the 400,000
or so guest workers that would likely be admitted on an annual basis
under a federal program would not even approach 1 percent of the
United States’ 311,388,943 residents.304 However, it is almost certain that
guest workers would constitute significant portions of certain labor sectors, causing certain sectors of the U.S. economy to become significantly
reliant upon guest workers. For instance, it is estimated that in 2008, un301. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM
EQUALITY 59 (1983). ([Guest workers] are locked into an inferior position . . . [t]hey are outcasts in a society that has no caste norms, metics in a society
where metics have no comprehensible, protected, and dignified places. That is why
the government of guest workers looks very much like a tyranny . . . .”).
302. Gordon, supra note 30, at 561.
303. See Conditions in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, supra
note 43, at 11 (statement of David B. Cohen, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for the Office of
Insular Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior).
304. U.S. and World Population Clocks, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.
census.gov/main/www/popclock.html (last visited May 20, 2010).
AND
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authorized workers comprised: 25 percent of the farming sector; 19 percent of the building, grounds-keeping and maintenance sectors; 17
percent of the construction sector; 12 percent of the food preparation and
serving sector; and 10 percent of the production sector.305 If guest workers
were to replace the unauthorized workers, and a program would certainly
steer them in this direction, they would likely populate these industries to
a similar extent. Accordingly, the impact guest workers could have on
wages and working conditions in many of the industries would not be that
different from the CNMI experience.
Adding credence to the claim that the CNMI example is relevant is
the fact that the problems that characterize the CNMI program, such as
recruitment scams, unpaid wages, substandard working conditions, discrimination and trafficking are the very ones that plague H-2 workers
under the current federal programs.306 This strongly suggests that the lessons from the CNMI should not be discounted notwithstanding the many
unique aspects of the CNMI program and society.
VI. GUEST WORKER PROGRAMS CANNOT BE REFORMED,
NOR CAN THEY HELP TO REFORM THE BROKEN
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM
With the evidence so overwhelming that unskilled guest worker programs are more of a state-run continuation of the unauthorized worker
sector than an antidote, the question of why guest worker programs are
held up by business interests and politicians as a critical component of
immigration reform is laid bare. The answer is not veiled or unspoken.
Indeed, it is argued by some immigration scholars and policymakers that
to be a successful program, the guest workers must rotate in and out of
the country according to the host country’s employment needs and must
be prevented from establishing roots in the host country.307 It is also understood that one reason these programs are economically desirable is
that guest workers tend to arrive in the host country in debt, and as such,
305. Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in
the United States, PEW HISPANIC CTR., 15 (Apr. 14, 2009), available at http://pew
hispanic.org/files/reports/107.pdf.
306. See discussion supra Part III.C.
307. See, e.g., MARTIN, MANAGING LABOR MIGRATION, supra note 13, at 86,
128–29; Martin Ruhs, The Potential of Temporary Migration Programmes in Future
International Migration Policy, POLICY ANALYSIS & RESEARCH PROGRAMME OF THE
GLOBAL COMM’N OF INT’L MIGRATION, 19–20 (Sept. 2005), available at http://
economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk/12666/1/TP3.pdf (suggesting measures to be taken to encourage and facilitate the return of guest workers to their home countries at the expiration of their visas).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\41-1\NMX103.txt

Spring 2011]

unknown

Seq: 51

GUEST WORKER PROGRAMS

7-NOV-11

14:01

181

“have an incentive to be good employees.”308 Indeed, one popular contractor of H-2A and H2-B workers has a website, unsubtly named “mexicanworker.com,” and which includes employer testimonials.309 In one
testimonial, an employer praises its “loyal and hardworking Mexican
workers,” and another exclaims that “the workers stick with me.”310 It has
also been documented that some contractors, in a bid to get the most
compliant guest workers possible and avoid “visa jumping,” refuse to hire
Mexican guest workers because they are more likely to have experience
in the United States and thus access to local social networks to help them
find an unauthorized job if conditions with the contracting employer are
poor.311 They instead hire workers with little experience with the United
States and who are from more remote countries, like Guatemala.312 Nor is
it a secret that unskilled guest workers are principally admitted to fill
undesirable and dangerous jobs.313 Thus, rotation and limits on guest
worker mobility and rights are necessary to ensure that they continue
performing the bottom-rung jobs they were recruited to perform.314 In
effect, these constraints would simply replace the current vulnerable, uncomplaining underclass of unauthorized immigrants with a vulnerable,
uncomplaining underclass of authorized guest workers.
The McCain-Kennedy–style guest worker programs lend currency
to this view. That is, the very fact of “earned adjustment” leaves no doubt
that the value of a guest worker program is in its ability to coerce workers
into performing specific, socially undesirable jobs. If it were otherwise,
these bills would simply grant 400,000 to 500,000 low-skilled workers
long-term permanent resident status. Instead, for the four-year adjustment period, the country would trade on guest workers’ economic vulnerability and, in addition, on the fierce desire of many to become U.S.

308. MARTIN, MANAGING LABOR MIGRATION, supra note 13, at 113.
309. MEXICAN-WORKERS.COM, http://www.mexicanworkers.com (June 3, 2011).
310. Id. (follow “Why Foreign Workers”).
311. Brinda Sarathy & Vanessa Casanova, Guest Workers or Unauthorized Immigrants? The Case of Forest Workers in the United States, 41 POL’Y SCI. 95, 105, 110–11
(2008).
312. Id. at 105, 110–11.
313. See MARTIN, MANAGING LABOR MIGRATION, supra note 13, at 83.
314. See WALZER, supra note 301, at 56–57 (describing how employers’ choice to
turn to international labor to fill jobs too “exhausting, dangerous, and degrading” for
domestic workers at the wage rates being offered is dependent on ensuring that the
workers are admitted only as “guests,” without political rights, and social and economic mobility); 2010 CRS GUEST WORKER REPORT, supra note 12, at 15 (noting
that some have voiced objections to a quick legalization process on the grounds that it
create labor shortages in undesirable jobs as former guest workers seek better work
opportunities).
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citizens, to ensure that they work in jobs certified as guest worker jobs.315
Guest workers must pay their dues by performing the dirty, dangerous,
and difficult jobs that those with a choice will not do (at least not at the
wage rates offered).
Given that guest worker programs succeed only so long as their participants are economically and culturally vulnerable and politically powerless, guest worker programs threaten to damage core American
democratic principles like equality and self-governance.316 Michael
Walzer has argued in connection with guest worker programs that the
creation of such a laboring class, with members who “resemble citizens in
[almost] every respect,” yet are barred from participation in the political
life of the host community and from citizenship, introduces tyranny into
the community.317 Thus, Walzer concludes, guest worker programs are
simply incompatible with democracy.318
Guest worker programs also call directly into question our commitment to liberal democracy by departing from the traditional integrationist
aim of U.S. immigration policy.319 Cristina Rodriguez points to guest

315. This period of “earned adjustment” as a guest worker would represent another step in what is already a long, often unwelcoming road to citizenship. Specifically, even if a guest worker were to matriculate to long-term permanent resident
status, he or she would still have to wait approximately five years to apply for naturalization. See DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 3 (2007). During this period, he or she would be vulnerable to deportation
for a violation of a host of requirements, including continuous residence, Englishlanguage skills, and strict compliance with U.S. laws. Id. Indeed, laws governing
noncitizens may be changed without notice, meaning that a long-term permanent resident may be deported for conduct that was not deportable when the individual applied for permanent status. Id. at 6.
316. See WALZER, supra note 301, at 58 (emphasizing that the success of a guest
worker program turns on the denial of principles that the nation holds dear—“political rights and civil liberties,” and the use of state power in the form of the deportation
regime to ensure that guest workers adhere to the system).
317. WALZER, supra note 301, at 58–61. It is possible that Walzer would find a
guest worker program that offered the possibility of earned adjustment to represent
less of a threat to democratic principles because the exclusion of guest workers from
civil society would theoretically not be permanent. However, for the reasons discussed previously, there exists the real possibility that the exclusion and mistreatment
of many guest workers would likely face during the “adjustment” period—when they
are without most civil and social rights—would ultimately lead many of those guest
workers who attain long-term permanent resident (LPR) status to choose to never
become full citizens, and thus to remain a caste separate and nonintegrated.
318. Id. at 61.
319. See Cristina M. Rodriguez, Guest Workers and Integration: Toward a Theory
of What Immigrants and Americans Owe One Another, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 219,
221 (arguing that guest worker programs in the long-term will “compromise our abil-
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workers’ lack of economic and social mobility and the United States’ lack
of reciprocal investment in guest workers as proof that such programs do
not fulfill the needs of immigrant integration.320 While she admits that a
guest worker program might be better than no response to the “persistence of undocumented immigration,”321 she suggests that its movement
away from the traditional goal of integration may result in significant social cleavages.322 Ruben Garcia indicates that guest worker programs contribute to the “democracy deficit,” which describe the growing power of
unelected institutions in the global community, such as the World Bank
and International Monetary Fund, and the large number of people residing in the United States who do not have the right to vote.323 He argues
that guest workers are treated much like commodities in the global market, in part because they have little political or legislative power in their
host country or in the international institutions that wield such control
over the market.324
Hiroshi Motomura has pointed to McCain-Kennedy–style guest
worker proposals that double as a path to earned citizenship as running
counter to this nation’s traditional immigration policy aims of encouraging integration and a sense of belonging through family, educational and
economic opportunities, and the equal treatment of citizens and immigrants.325 Motomura suggests that policies that treat new immigrants tenity to integrate immigrants effectively into the American body politic”); see also S.
REP. NO. 106-204, at 32 (1999) (statement by Sen. Lisa Murkowski) (criticizing the
CNMI’s guest worker program as failing to comport with the “American tradition of
employing U.S. workers in private sector jobs that promote the growth of a middle
class, rather than importing and exploiting a rolling stream of alien workers, without
permanent immigrant status or family ties, in low-paid permanent positions, most to
be kept almost all the time on their employers’ premises”).
320. Rodriguez, supra note 319, at 222–23. Rodriguez suggests that the desired
endpoint of integration is assimilation, or at a point where immigrants become full
participants in a country’s economic, social, and cultural life by “becoming not only
contributors but equals.” Id. at 232–34.
321. Id. at 288.
322. Id. at 230 (citing Hiroshi Motomura, Choosing Immigrants, Making Citizens,
59 STAN. L. REV. 857, 869–70 (2007)).
323. Ruben J. Garcia, Labor as Property: Guest Workers, International Trade,
and the Democracy Deficit, 10 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 27, 41–42 (2006).
324. Id. at 28, 41–42, 44–45. Garcia notes that guest workers may have some political power in their home country, but that depends on the laws of each country. Id.
at 43–44.
325. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING 140, 162–63 (2006) (observing that the trend in the United States seems to be moving away from treating
most immigrants as Americans in waiting and moving in the direction of immigration
as affiliation, which is acquired through the development of family and community
ties or earned through work); see also Remarks by the President on Comprehensive
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tatively and as something other than potential citizens upon arrival (or, as
he refers to them, “Americans in waiting”) impede both goals of integration and equality.326 According to Motomura, integration, which he defines not as assimilation into the dominant culture, but as a “reciprocal
process in which immigrants change America as much as America
changes them,” is the best avenue for equality. It has been argued that
true integration means that citizens regard and treat immigrants as fellow
citizens or as citizens-in-the-making—and immigrants, in turn, feel truly
welcomed.327 Immigration policies that fail to treat immigrants equally
upon arrival impede and delay integration and ultimately diminish the
desire of immigrants who eventually acquire (or earn) permanent resident status to become full citizens because they were marginalized as
newcomers, rather than welcomed and integrated.328 Motomura suggests
that policies that subordinate new immigrants threaten to harm the nation and our liberal democracy by leading many to choose “more parochial and less cosmopolitan or democratic” affiliations, such as those
defined by race or ethnicity, rather than an affiliation with the nation
through citizenship.329
Some immigration rights advocates and immigration law scholars
have contended that guest worker programs represent a reasonable compromise in the polarized arena of immigration reform, and one that is
surely superior to the status quo of mass, unauthorized immigration.330
However, the evidence is far from clear that guest workers are better off

Immigration Reform, THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y (July 1, 2010),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-comprehensive-immigration-reform (reaffirming our nation’s self-image as “a nation of immigrants—a nation that welcomes those willing to embrace America’s precepts,” and
one that recognizes that the immigrants “helped to make America what it is”).
326. See MOTOMURA, supra note 325, at 165–67.
327. See id. at 163–64.
328. Id. at 164–67. Apparently the allure of citizenship has already waned, with
an average of 40 percent of lawful immigrants eligible for naturalization opting not to
apply. Id. at 143–44.
329. Id.
330. See, e.g., Janet Murguia, A Change of Heart on Guest Workers, WASH. POST,
Feb. 11, 2007, at B7 (article by then-president of the National Council of La Raza
explaining the organization’s cautious shift to supporting guest worker programs as a
means of dealing with the future flow of immigrants in an orderly, humane way);
Manuel Pastor & Susan Alva, Guest Workers and the New Transnationalism: Possibilities and Realities in an Age of Repression, 31 SOC. JUST. 92, 92–95 (2004) (arguing
for workers’ and immigrants’ advocates to begin considering guest worker programs
as a possible component of contemporary immigration policy in light of new migration patterns); Andrew J. Elmore, Egalitarianism and Exclusion: U.S. Guest Worker
Programs and a Non-Subordination Approach to the Labor-Based Admission of Non-
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than unauthorized workers. And further, most in this camp assume that a
reformed guest worker program is within easy reach.331 For instance,
Howard Chang champions guest worker programs as a “second-best policy” to open borders from a cosmopolitan perspective.332 He argues that
the alternative of excluding unskilled and often impoverished aliens from
the nation, in the name of protecting them from exploitation, actually
leaves the aliens worse off than a guest worker program.333 Likewise, Andrew Elmore, Assistant Attorney General in the Civil Rights Bureau of
the New York State Office of the Attorney General, has written in support of guest worker programs as a key ingredient of immigration reform
on the ground that ending them while continuing the status quo of exclusion would likely increase unauthorized migration at the expense of liberty, equality, and sovereignty.334 He also doubts that expanding
permanent resident admissions would be a realistic solution, and would
likely come at the expense of family reunification.335 These arguments
cannot withstand the evidence.
First, it is not at all clear that existing unskilled guest workers labor
under conditions that are any better, or less oppressive, than unauthorized immigrants have in comparable jobs. In a recent study of unauthorized and H-2B forest industry workers, the researchers concluded that
“there was no significant difference in the working conditions” of the two
groups, and that both “face[d] labor exploitation,” although the causes of
each group’s vulnerability were slightly different.336 Specifically, they
found the H-2B guest workers in the forestry industry were vulnerable to
labor exploitation because of: (1) isolation at their worksites; (2) their
reliance on contractors for their jobs, housing, and transportation; (3)
their fear of losing their jobs; and (4) ignorance of their rights. On the
other hand, the researchers attributed the vulnerability of the unauthorized workers to their fear of being deported and because they were indebted to relatives who secured their jobs.337 Notably, they found that

professional Foreign Nationals, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 521, 523–27 (2007) (arguing for
a “non-subordination” approach to labor-based admissions).
331. See, e.g., Howard F. Chang, Liberal Ideals and Political Feasibility: GuestWorker Programs as Second-Best Policies, 27 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 465, 465
(2002) (suggesting that the renewed efforts by the Bush administration, in addition to
support by labor unions and business interests, “may make liberalizing reforms politically feasible in the near future”).
332. Chang, supra note 23, at 6.
333. See id. at 9.
334. See Elmore, supra note 330, at 557–61.
335. Id. at 559.
336. See Brinda Sarathy & Vanessa Casanova, supra note 311, at 107, 112.
337. See id.
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because unauthorized workers had more developed social networks, they
were considerably less isolated than the guest workers.338 Some have even
suggested that unauthorized workers, who have more job mobility, are
less vulnerable to abuse than guest workers.339
Second, many of those who have argued in favor of a guest worker
program as a component of comprehensive reform assume that such a
program can fundamentally transform the exploitative characteristics that
have historically defined guest worker programs.340 For the reasons discussed in Part V, such reforms are not realistic. This is because the exploitation that has always accompanied guest worker programs is not
simply a matter of degree,341 but a characteristic inherent in state-controlled guest worker programs.342 That is, the very attributes that make
guest worker programs economically efficient, and therefore desired by
the state, are what leave guest workers so vulnerable to abuse. Such attributes predominately consist of the ability of the state to limit guest
worker mobility to undesirable sectors and its ability to keep a constant
flow of uncomplaining replacements coming. And these same attributes
are exactly what many business interests seek, causing them to condition
their support of comprehensive immigration-reform legislation upon the
inclusion of a guest worker program.343 Without a supply of guest workers
to fill the positions abandoned by the unauthorized workers, employers

338. Id.
339. Garcia, supra note 316, at 46.
340. See Chang, supra note 23, at 8. For instance, Howard Chang’s proposed
guest worker program would resolve the exploitation problem by allowing guest
workers “full mobility” between economic sectors and full workplace rights. Id. Similarly, the type of program proponed by Andrew Elmore would be reformed along the
lines of what he refers to as a “non-subordination” approach. Elmore, supra note 334,
at 522. Its key features would be a thorough de-coupling of guest worker immigration
status from a particular employer, full workplace rights, and effective, accessible enforcement mechanisms, and paths for unauthorized migrants and guest workers to
adjust to permanent immigration status so they can follow more circular paths of migration. Id. at 561–67.
341. See Chang, supra note 23, at 8 (arguing that increasing the mobility of guest
worker’s will reduce workers’ exploitation and objections to guest worker programs
“[are] really a matter of degree, and a program that provides complete mobility for
the guest worker seems much less vulnerable to [such] objections”).
342. See supra Part V. This article’s critique is limited to state-controlled guest
worker programs, leaving open the possibility that programs run by workers themselves, or other enlightened non-governmental bodies, such as the program envisioned by Jennifer Gordon in her article on transnational labor citizenship, might defy
this characterization. See Gordon, supra note 30, at 565–70; supra note 30 (discussing
Gordon’s proposed program).
343. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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could suddenly find themselves without workers willing to perform their
undesirable jobs at a bargain rate. Finally, guest worker programs have
not been shown to reduce unauthorized immigration. To the contrary,
they have historically led to more, not less, unauthorized immigration.344
Thus, the introduction of a large-scale guest worker program would
simply supplement the current underground system of exploitation of unauthorized immigrants with a state-run system of exploitation of authorized immigrants. As such, it would represent a sharp departure from
longstanding efforts to combat human exploitation in the workplace and
beyond.345 Indeed, the historical trend in the area of labor and employment law has been to provide workers with greater legal protections and
bargaining rights to lessen exploitation.346 For instance, the Equal Pay Act
was enacted to protect women from exploitation they might suffer due to
their particularly weak bargaining positions;347 and the Migrant Seasonal
Agricultural Worker Protection Act was passed “to reverse the historical
pattern of abuse and exploitation of migrant and seasonal farm workers.”348 Arguably, the federal government took its most aggressive legisla-

344. See MARTIN, MANAGING LABOR MIGRATION, supra note 13, at 95.
345. One exception, however, is the state’s involvement in fostering conditions
that lead to the exploitation of workers in the H-2A and H-2B programs. See supra
Part III.
346. See Garcia, supra note 316, at 35 (“History shows workers progressively
gaining more bargaining power over the terms and conditions of their employment
over the last two centuries.”). This is not to suggest that the laws have been effective
in rooting out exploitation, but this has been their stated aim. Indeed, lax enforcement and employer-oriented court decisions have long countered these aims, particularly where immigrant workers have been involved. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacon,
Misery and Myopia: Understanding the Failures of U.S. Efforts to Stop Human Trafficking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2977, 3040 (2006) (asserting that “[t]he failure to protect workers who are victims of abusive labor practices has been a feature of the U.S.
legal landscape throughout history, and it has worsened in recent years”); Hoffman
Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 149–52 (2002) (holding that an unauthorized immigrant worker who was terminated for union activities was not entitled
to back pay since he was not legally authorized to work); Paul Weiler, Promises to
Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1769, 1781 (1983) (noting that then “current odds” were that an average of one
in twenty workers was fired for attempting to organize a union in violation of “rights
supposedly guaranteed . . . a half-century ago” by the National Labor Relations
Act).
347. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 206 (1974) (“Congress
enacted the Equal Pay Act recognizing the weaker bargaining position of many women and believing that discrimination in wage rates represented unfair employer exploitation of this source of cheap labor.”) (internal quotations omitted).
348. 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(5)(ii) (2011) (quoting H. Rep. No. 97-885, 97th Cong.,
1982).
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tive step yet when, in 2000, it enacted the Trafficking Victims Protection
Act (TVPA) to combat the modern trade of human beings.349 In the view
of Dina Francesca Haynes, the TVPA represented nothing less than an
“attempt[ ] to counter . . . the practice of using human beings as
commodities.”350
The introduction of a large-scale guest worker program would
counter this trend because guest worker programs are generally breeding
grounds for exploitation, including its most virulent form—trafficking.351
Indeed, in the 2008 Reauthorization of the TVPA, Congress explicitly acknowledged the unique vulnerability of guest workers to trafficking, and
required that U.S. State Department consular offices create and distribute pamphlets that set forth the rights of all such workers.352 In addition, the State Department has recognized that migrant laborers are
particularly vulnerable to trafficking schemes that involve debt bondage
and involuntary servitude.353

349. 22 U.S.C. § 7101 (2006).
350. Dina Francesca Haynes, Exploitation Nation: The Thin and Grey Lines Between Trafficked Persons and Abused Migrant Laborers, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL’Y 1, 43 (2009). This is not to say the TVPA has achieved this end. Indeed,
many have criticized its implementation and effectiveness. See, e.g., WOMEN’S
COMM. FOR REFUGEE WOMEN & CHILDREN, THE U.S. RESPONSE TO HUMAN TRAFFICKING: AN UNBALANCED APPROACH 17 (2007), available at http://womensrefugee
commission.org/reports/doc_download/472-the-us-response-to-human-trafficking-anunbalanced-approach (criticizing the TVPA for conditioning benefits and other relief
on cooperation with law enforcement); Chacon, supra note 346, at 2979 (attributing
the ineffectiveness of the TVPA in part on “U.S. law and policy that actually facilitate” human trafficking).
351. See supra Part III.C.3.
352. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of
2008, PUB. L. NO. 110-457, § 202, 112 Stat. 5055. Notably, the Act requires that one
provision of the pamphlet advise of “the illegality of . . . worker exploitation in the
United States.” Id. § 202(b)(3). It also requires inclusion of provisions relating to the
illegality of “slavery, peonage, trafficking in persons, sexual assault, extortion, [and]
blackmail.” Id.
353. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 20 (2008), available at http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2008. The State Department has identified
three factors as contributing to migrants’ susceptibility to trafficking:
Abuse of contracts; 2) Inadequate local laws governing the recruitment and
employment of migrant laborers; and 3) The intentional imposition of exploitative and often illegal costs and debts on these laborers in the source
country or state, often with the complicity and/or support of labor agencies
and employers in the destination country or state.

Id. Significantly, it was careful to clarify that high recruitment fees alone do not constitute debt bondage or involuntary servitude, but only “place laborers in a situation
highly vulnerable to debt bondage.” Id. Rather, the magic ingredient that transforms
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Thus, a large-scale unskilled guest worker program would represent
a large step backward in the campaign against worker exploitation and
the trade in human labor. Guest worker programs, including those with
McCain-Kennedy–style reforms, are exploitative. Specifically, such programs deliberately take advantage of the material and psychological vulnerabilities of most unskilled guest workers, including their poverty,
cultural and linguistic isolation, and strong desire to become citizens in
order to meet the nation’s employment needs at a cheap rate. In short:
guest worker programs treat migrants as commodities by design.354 What
is more, a McCain-Kennedy–style program with its period of earned adjustment would harness a state’s apparatus, specifically, its deportation
capabilities in combination with its offer of citizenship, coercively maximizing the economic output of a disenfranchised laboring class of guest
workers—a profoundly undemocratic proposition.
A guest worker program with an earned adjustment component
would also represent a significant step away from the nation’s revered
self-image as a nation of immigrants. To be true to that tradition, immigrants should be welcomed at the outset as “Americans in waiting,” and
integration promoted from the point of arrival.355 A program of earned
adjustment that delays integration for many years while the immigrants
toil in dangerous and undesirable jobs, largely surrounded by many of
their same ethnicity and class while “earning” the right to become citizens, certainly does not foment integration. This is particularly the case if
guest workers are commonly subjected to exploitation and abuse, as established by the evidence.
VII. CONCLUSION
Legislators considering comprehensive immigration reform should
heed the evidence. The experience of the CNMI guest worker program
powerfully demonstrates that even programs that contain key worker
safeguards of the kind that have been included in all comprehensive reform proposals in recent years—like portability, considerable government oversight, and an accessible comprehensive administrative
complaint system—will be characterized by worker exploitation and
abuse. And the possibility of earned adjustment to permanent residence
and eventual citizenship is no solution because it will only strengthen employers’ hands, and further stifle workers’ voices, so long as adjustment is
high recruitment fees into debt bondage is “exploitation by unscrupulous labor agents
or employers in the destination country.” Id.
354. See Haynes, supra note 350, at 44.
355. MOTOMURA, supra note 325, at 162–65.
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contingent upon continued employment. In addition, even if such a program features a highly functioning complaint process that is wellresourced and staffed, and includes a mechanism that allows complaining
guest workers to remain in the United States to pursue their complaints,
the CNMI program teaches that this will lead to a deluge of legitimate
and illegitimate complaints. In short, any guest worker program that has
been contemplated, or that can be crafted in the current political climate,
will not sufficiently disengage guest workers from their dependence on
employers, nor contain sufficient oversight, protections, or administrative
safeguards to ensure that it does not result in widespread exploitation of
guest workers. Furthermore, it is unlikely that a guest worker program
will diminish unauthorized immigration to a significant extent. Essentially, it will supplement, and largely function like, the unauthorized
workforce that immigration reform is reputedly designed to dismantle.
A large-scale guest worker program that doubles as a path for immigrants to “earn” the right through hard labor to become Americans counters a central and cherished narrative about America: that this is a nation
that welcomes immigrants as equals, and has thrived because of immigrants’ contributions to every sector of society. As President Obama reflected in a recent speech on comprehensive immigration reform:
[W]e’ve always defined ourselves as a nation of immigrants—a nation that welcomes those willing to embrace America’s precepts.
Indeed, it is this constant flow of immigrants that helped to make
America what it is. The scientific breakthroughs of Albert Einstein, the inventions of Nikola Tesla, the great ventures of Andrew
Carnegie’s U.S. Steel and Sergey Brin’s Google, Inc.—all this was
possible because of immigrants.
And then there are the countless names and the quiet acts
that never made the history books but were no less consequential
in building this country—the generations who braved hardship
and great risk to reach our shores in search of a better life for
themselves and their families; the millions of people, ancestors to
most of us, who believed that there was a place where they could
be, at long last, free to work and worship and live their lives in
peace.
So this steady stream of hardworking and talented people
has made America the engine of the global economy and a beacon
of hope around the world.356

356. Remarks by the President on Comprehensive Immigration Reform, THE
WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y (July 1, 2010), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-comprehensive-immigrationreform.
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Introducing potential new Americans to this nation as guest workers, likely to endure exploitation and abuse along the way, threatens this
storied history by discouraging reciprocal commitment and loyalty to the
nation, and instead encouraging “more parochial . . . less democratic” affiliations, like race or ethnicity.357 A guest worker program will not help
to fix our broken immigration system, and would represent a step away
from the nation’s proud tradition as a nation of immigrants that reveres
equality and eschews castes.

357.

MOTOMURA, supra note 325, at 166–67.
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